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BABIES WITHOUT BORDERS: HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN 




In recent decades, a robust international market in commercial 
reproductive surrogacy has emerged. But, as German citizens Jan Balaz and 
Susan Lohle discovered when they struggled to engineer the last-minute 
diplomatic compromise that saved their commissioned twins from becoming 
wards of the Indian state, conflicts among legal frameworks have placed the 
children born at risk of being “marooned stateless and parentless.”1 States 
have tried to address individual dramas through ad hoc solutions—issuing 
emergency entry documents for children caught at borders or compelling 
administrative authorities to recognize birth certificates related to surrogacy 
arrangements that run counter to domestic public policies, and judges have 
attempted to craft doctrines that inevitably—and necessarily—correspond to 
the specificities of the cases before and their own legal systems. But the 
inadequacy of such approaches has become increasingly evident. As a result, 
states have developed national legislation and, together with international 
institutions and civil society networks, begun to seek international agreements. 
Indeed, international coordination represents the only viable solution to the 
individual dramas and diplomatic crises that have characterized the market in 
international commercial surrogacy. But will that be possible? This Article 
 
 ∗ School of International and Public Affairs and Institute for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia 
University. Numerous colleagues have provided a sounding board, and sound advice, for this Article. Special 
thanks are due to José Alvarez, George Bermann, Danielle Celermajer, Michael Doyle, Henry Ergas, Ira 
Katznelson, Claire Kelly, Kenneth Prewitt, Jack Snyder and Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Thanks are also due 
to participants in the seminars and workshops at which I have discussed earlier versions of this article 
including the Institut Emilie du Chatelet in Paris, the University of Sydney, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the 
Columbia University Human Rights Seminar, the International Law Association, and the Columbia University 
workshop on “Deconstructing and Reconstructing ‘Mother.’” I have also benefited from conversations with 
William Duncan, Louise Teitz, and Hannah Baker of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Lisa 
Vogel of the U.S. State Department, and Katherine Franke, Suzanne Goldberg, Alice Kesssler-Harris, Carol 
Sanger, and Elizabeth Scott at Columbia University. Invaluable research assistance was provided by Jenny 
Leon, Caroline Risacher, and Marta Garnelo. Finally, this essay could not have been written without the help, 
comments and support of Leonard Groopman and Sofia Groopman. 
 1 Re X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy), [2008] EWHC (Fam) 3030 [10] (Eng.). 
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explores whether and to what extent a coordinated approach is likely to be 
found, and the role and limits of international law. 
After a brief introduction, this Article examines the vicissitudes of the Balaz 
twins as emblematic of the filiation and citizenship issues that the international 
market in commercial surrogacy raises (Part I). It then explores possible 
approaches to the conflicts among legal systems that underlie the Balaz case, 
whether through individual contracts (Part II) or treaties (Part III). This 
Article predicts that, at least in the short term, an effective legalizing regime 
based on a unifying set of rules and norms is unlikely to emerge. Ultimately, a 
new regime will require a long-term renegotiation of the meanings of filiation, 
its significance for citizenship, and the re-interpretation of fundamental norms 
relating to human rights. 
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INTRODUCTION: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The means of baby-making have expanded precipitously in the last three 
decades, prompted by scientific advances and transformations in social 
organization and gender relations.2 At the same time, globalization has favored 
the search for cross-border solutions to the problems associated with 
reproductive difficulties (or, more simply, with the decision to have children 
without engaging in their production). The rapid expansion of transnational 
adoptions, beginning in the 1970s, highlighted the existence of a growing 
market for babies in which particular states came to be characterized as 
exporters and others as importers (and some as both). Such an expansion de 
facto functioned as a global “learning experience,” showing individuals 
without enormous resources in, say, material means or worldly knowledge, the 
path to foreign destinations in their quest to reproduce.3 Born at the same time 
 
 2 Cf. Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. 
GENDER 67, 94 (2007). 
 3 Mark Alpert, New U.S. Export to Japan: Babies, CNNMONEY: FORTUNE (Aug. 10, 1992), http:// 
money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1992/08/10/76762/index.htm. 
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as the Internet,4 the global surrogacy market has expanded as service 
providers—including the women offering themselves as gestational carriers, 
lawyers proffering their counsel, and agencies buying and selling gametes to 
medical institutions—have transacted over long distances, transferring goods 
(gametes) to bodies (gestational carriers) and then products (children) across 
jurisdictional lines.5 The political economy of reproduction that has emerged is 
fully globalized: Analyses of “care chains” have documented the migration of 
women from the global south to provide nanny and elder care services in the 
north, and the distribution of children available for transnational adoption 
evinces similar patterns.6 Analogous trends have emerged with respect to 
surrogacy: A study of five brokerage agencies reports a cumulative growth of 
nearly 1000 percent and a significant increase in cross-border clientele 
between 2006 and 2010.7 
The case of the Balaz twins, commissioned by German citizens in India, 
reveals the consequences that ensue when individuals ground a basic activity 
of life—having children—simultaneously in legal systems whose rules 
conflict. Caught between German prohibitions regarding surrogacy and Indian 
policies seeking to promote the market in baby making,8 Leonard and Nikolas 
Balaz appeared destined to become wards of the Indian state. The agreement 
commissioning their birth, a contract ostensibly governing all parties, was 
written exclusively by private actors.9 This arrangement treated filiation as a 
 
 4 See Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference on Private International Law, A Preliminary Report on the 
Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements 7 (Prel. Doc. No. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Hague 
Conference Report 2012] (“The growth in these cross-border arrangements has undoubtedly been facilitated by 
the Internet, other modern means of communication, and the ease of international travel.”). 
 5 On factors affecting the development of the surrogacy market, see generally Sanger, supra note 2. For 
a discussion of the surrogacy market in the context of the fertility market, see generally DEBORA L. SPAR, THE 
BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 31–96 (2006). 
 6 See generally CONCEIVING THE NEW WORLD ORDER: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION (Faye 
D. Ginsburg & Rayna Rapp eds., 1995); CULTURES OF TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION (Toby A. Volkman ed., 
2005); THE GLOBALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD (Wendy Chavkin & JaneMaree Maher eds., 2010). 
 7 The agencies, surveyed by the Aberdeen University research project on international surrogacy 
arrangements, are based in the United States, India, and the United Kingdom. Separately, one agency reported 
that in 2008 “almost forty percent of the agency’s new clients are from outside the [country] . . . compared 
with less than a fifth in previous years.” Hague Conference Report 2012, supra note 4, at 8. 
 8 Embryonenschutzgesetz [ESchG] [Embryo Protection Act], Dec. 13. 1990, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil 
I [BGBL. I] at 2746, § 1, last amended by Präimplantationsdiagnostikgesetz [PräimpG], Nov. 21, 2011, BGBL. 
I at 2228, art. 1 (Ger.); Hillary Brenhouse, India’s Rent-a-Womb Industry Faces New Restrictions, TIME (June 
5, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1993665,00.html (“In 2002 [India] legalized 
commercial surrogacy in an effort to promote medical tourism . . . .”). 
 9 Balaz v. Anand Municipality, LPA 2151/2009 (Gujarat H.C. 2009) para. 2 [hereinafter Balaz v. Anand 
Municipality], available at http://gujarathc-casestatus.nic.in/gujarathc/tabhome.jsp (Under “CaseDetail” tab, 
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matter of contract rather than status, whereas the regulation of reproduction 
and familial relations bears the imprints of nation-building and social policies 
and as such is not simply a matter subject to individual negotiation. 
Resolutions to dramas like that of the Balaz twins require interstate 
coordination, possibly in the form of an agreement on international commercial 
surrogacy. Such an agreement requires negotiations over deeply held values 
that, in many states, implicate constitutional principles and may have 
significant distributive consequences. Moreover, family relations, filiation, and 
their nexus to nationality and citizenship lie at the heart of what has 
traditionally been understood as the domestic jurisdiction of states.10 Despite 
the progressive expansion of the scope of international law,11 the often-
documented erosion of the Westphalian system—the “basic constitutional 
doctrine of the law of nations”12—and the contested nature of the distinction 
between matters that appropriately fall within the reserved domain of state 
jurisdiction and those that do not, when “an issue is prima facie within the 
reserved domain because of its nature and the issue presented in the normal 
case then certain presumptions against any restrictions on that domain may be 
created.”13 Consequently, while matters relating to domestic relations and to 
citizenship have been the subject of treaties, it is nonetheless likely that both 
national and international policymakers and courts will tread carefully. A 
global accord capable of imposing uniform regulations on the transnational 
surrogacy market is therefore difficult to envisage, but a bifurcated regime, 
based on the reciprocal acknowledgment of a permissive and a prohibitionist 
“treaty zone,” seems more likely. Both states and individuals operating in a 
bifurcated regime must be understood as—indeed, can already be seen to be—
 
select “ “LPA-Letters Patent Appeal” as “Casetype” and enter “2151” as “CaseNumber” and “2009” as 
“CaseYear,” then click “Go.” Download Order dated 11/11/2009.). 
 10 “ It is for Liechtenstein, as it is for every sovereign State, to settle by its own legislation the rules 
relating to the acquisition of its nationality, and to confer that nationality by naturalization granted by its own 
organs in accordance with that legislation. . . . Nationality serves above all to determine that the person upon 
whom it is conferred enjoys the rights and is bound by the obligations which the law of the State in question 
grants to or imposes on its nationals. This is implied in the wider concept that nationality is within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the State.” Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 20 (Apr. 6). Nonetheless 
the Nottebohm Court founded its judgment on the distinction between states’ appropriate exercise of domestic 
jurisdiction and the effectiveness of their acts on the international plane. Id. at 21 (“International practice 
provides many examples of acts performed by States in the exercise of their domestic jurisdiction which do not 
necessarily or automatically have international effect, which are not necessarily and automatically binding on 
other States or which are binding on them only subject to certain conditions.”)  
 11 For an early review, see Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Dimensions of International Law, 62 
COLUM. L. REV. 1147 (1962).  
 12 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 291 (7th ed. 2008). 
 13 Id. at 294. 
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apprehending the regime in a unitary manner, deriving advantages from, as 
well as bearing the consequences of, its segmentation. But the possibility of 
interstate agreement does not per se determine the legality of the accords or of 
the overarching regime that therefore emerges. On the contrary, such 
agreements will be held to the test of international human rights law, and 
whether they hold up will depend on the specific understandings of surrogacy 
and filiation as well as of human rights that legislators, administrators, and 
judiciaries develop in dialogue with political and civil society actors. 
I. CHRONICLE OF A BIRTH FORETOLD 
A. The Balaz Twins: Trapped Between Permissive and Prohibitionist 
Jurisdictions 
In November 2009, the High Court of Gujarat passed down a judgment that 
seems unremarkable at first glance: A child born on Indian soil of an Indian 
mother and a foreign father, the Court held, is an Indian national.14 The 
decision could be seen as a straightforward application of current law, which, 
since December 2004, has attributed citizenship to children born in India if 
both parents are citizens of India or one parent is a citizen and the other does 
not fall under certain narrow exceptions.15 But the decision portended a radical 
reordering of the legal status of the children and parents implicated in India’s 
thriving surrogacy industry and, indeed, of the industry itself. 
The case was not a straightforward one. A German citizen, Jan Balaz, had 
sought a declaratory judgment of the Gujarat Court that his twin children, born 
in Anand as a result of surrogacy arrangements, could be considered Indian 
nationals.16 Balaz and his wife, Susan Lohle, faced with her infertility, had 
chosen to have children through reproductive surrogacy.17 Such a solution 
would have been impossible in Germany, as in numerous other countries of the 
European Union, which has banned surrogacy in all its forms, whether 
“commercial” (i.e., for payment) or “altruistic” (i.e., rendered without explicit 
 
 14 Balaz v. Anand Municipality, supra note 9, para. 16. 
 15 The Citizenship Amendment Act of 2003, § 3 states that citizenship will not be conferred on a child 
born in India if either parent is a foreign diplomat accredited as such in India or is an enemy alien and the child 
is born in a place that is under enemy occupation. The Citizenship Act, 1955, No. 57, Acts of Parliament, 
1955, amended by The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003, No. 4, Acts of Parliament, 2004 (India). 
 16 Balaz v. Anand Municipality, supra note 9, paras. 2, 5. 
 17 Id. para. 2. 
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financial compensation).18 The Balazes might have considered other 
possibilities. They could, for example, have traveled to California, a state in 
which the surrogacy market is relatively mature, as measured by the existence 
of a reasonably settled legal framework, a well-oiled system of service 
providers (mediators, clinics, sellers, and buyers), and a steady flow of 
transactions.19 Or they could have chosen to go to Ukraine, where a permissive 
governmental attitude and the considerable availability of service providers 
coupled with a reliable medical system has generated a thriving, albeit not risk-
free, market in commissioned children.20 Without presuming to guess the 
motivations that led the Balazes to India, theirs was a reasonable choice, one 
made by others in their position and encouraged by government policies that 
see reproductive surrogacy as an aspect of an expanding health and medical 
tourism trade.21 
 
 18 See Embryonenschutzgesetz [ESchG] [Embryo Protection Act], Dec. 13. 1990, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, 
Teil I [BGBL. I] at 2746, § 1, last amended by Präimplantationsdiagnostikgesetz [PräimpG], Nov. 21, 2011, 
BGBL. I at 2228, art. 1 (Ger.), which also prohibits egg-donation, and provides that no medical practitioner 
should perform artificial insemination or embryo donation on a woman who is willing to hand the child over to 
commissioning parents upon birth in accordance with a surrogacy agreement. 
 19 As Hofman noted in 2005, “California’s case law is almost legend, it is so well known. Although the 
state has yet to enact statutory language explicitly authorizing and regulating surrogacy, its case law addresses 
the issue extensively, with large reliance on the Uniform Parentage Act and emphasis on the intent of the 
parties.” Darra L. Hofman, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s Maybe:” A State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and 
Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 449, 455 n.19 (2009). The emphasis on the role of 
intent in determining parentage beginning with Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778–83 (Cal. 1993), has 
made California a reliable market for surrogacy. 
 20 See Claire Biggs & Courtney Brooks, Ukraine Surrogacy Boom Not Risk-Free, RADIO FREE EUR. 
RADIO LIBERTY (June 4, 2011), http://www.rferl.org/content/womb_for_hire_ukraine_surrogacy_boom_is_ 
not_risk_free/24215336.html. 
 21 Although it is difficult to find precise figures on the size of the market in reproductive surrogacy, 
according to one estimate it amounts to about $400 million annually in India’s medical tourism industry, which 
is expected to reach $2.3 billion by 2012. Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference on Private International Law, 
Private International Law Issues Surrounding the Status of Children, Including Issues Arising from 
International Surrogacy Arrangements 7 ( Prel. Doc. No. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Hague Conference Report 
2011]. For a critical analysis of the implications of this expansion from the perspective of the Indian women 
who service the industry, see Shayantani DasGupta & Shamita Das DasGupta, Motherhood Jeopardized, in 
THE GLOBALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD, supra note 6, at 131–47 (concluding that assisted reproductive 
technology in India “has ultimately exacerbated women’s ‘unfreedoms’, and therefore undermined, rather than 
supported, their agency”); Usha Rengachary Smerdon, Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: International 
Surrogacy Between the United States and India, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 15–16 (2008) (concluding that 
“abolition of international surrogacy is the only solution that will protect all parties given the ethical concerns 
involved”); see also Ganapati Mudur, India Plans to Expand Private Sector in Healthcare Review, 326 BRIT. 
MED. J. 520 (2003); Sunita Reddy & Imrana Qadeer, Medical Tourism in India: Progress or Predicament?, 
ECON. & POL. WKLY., May 15, 2010, at 69; Jennifer Rimm, Booming Baby Business: Regulating Commercial 
Surrogacy in India, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1429 (2009). 
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The birth of the Balaz twins appears to have proceeded according to plan. 
The Balazes engaged the services of Dr. Patel, a leading surrogacy 
entrepreneur who has recently garnered the attention of western media.22 At 
the Balazes’ behest—and as she appears to have done innumerable times 
before—Dr. Nayna Patel obtained ova from one woman and engaged another 
to carry the embryo.23 Jan Balaz contributed his own sperm.24 The arrangement 
reflected the paradigm of surrogacy today: Gestational surrogacy, in which one 
woman provides ova and another carries the pregnancy, has become the 
marker of surrogate motherhood, superseding traditional surrogacy, in which 
one woman serves as both egg donor and gestator. The provider of ova, 
stripped of maternal reference altogether, is referred to in the sexually 
neutralized language of genetic donation. As a contributor of “genetic 
material,” the ova provider is now semantically equated to a sperm donor.25 In 
fact, the case law would suggest that the sperm donor is often—as in this 
case—the biological as well as the commissioning father. If he is not a 
commissioning party, and the sperm is obtained through a sperm bank then he 
is often compensated for his sperm.26 In either case, he is not really a “donor” 
at all.27 The egg donor is also not a “donor” in any sense that can reasonably be 
associated with gratuitous gifting. To the contrary, prices for ova range, in the 
United States, from approximately $8,000 to (reportedly) many multiples of 
 
 22 Sam Dolnick, Pregnancy Becomes Latest Job Outsourced to India, USA TODAY (Dec. 30, 2007), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2007-12-30-surrogacy_N.htm. 
 23 Balaz v. Anand Municipality, supra note 9, para. 2. 
 24 Id. 
 25 The language of surrogacy is fraught with ambiguity. Arguably, the surrogate is not a surrogate at all if 
she is indeed a “mother.” Another way of referring to the woman who bears the child would be as a “birth 
mother,” borrowing a term from adoption discourse. But promoters of surrogacy have a strong stake in 
distinguishing surrogacy from adoption, emphasizing, for instance, the but-for nature of the reproduction at 
issue (there would have been no child but for the arrangement among the parties), hence clearly differentiating 
the lexicon of surrogacy from that of adoption. In the words of an employer of surrogate services, “[T]here is 
no biological mother.” See Melanie Thernstrom, My Futuristic Insta-Family, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2010, § 6 
(Magazine), at 28. If maternity is radically disjoined from its physical correlate, then the so-called surrogate 
mother is neither mother nor surrogate but simply a “womb provider.” Id. I use the term “womb provider” to 
highlight the implications of a way of looking at reproduction, not to endorse it. 
 26 See Guido Pennings, The Rough Guide to Insemination: Cross-Border Travelling for Donor Semen 
Due to Different Regulations, 2 FACTS, VIEWS & VISION OBGYN 55, 56 (2010) (noting that “[w]hen countries 
abolish [sperm] donor anonymity or make payment for donors illegal, this has an impact on the number of 
candidates” and that Canadian regulations prohibiting payment have led to the fact that 80% of children born 
in Canada of donor-sperm have an American donor; “[i]nterestingly, this means that these donors were paid 
for their donation”). 
 27 The legislation of several countries requires that there be a biological nexus between at least one of the 
commissioning parents and the child in order for the arrangement to constitute legal “surrogacy” (as opposed, 
say, to a simple—and prohibited—sale). 
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that figure.28 And the womb provider has been reduced to a figure that 
alternates between a sherpa and a landlord: Some refer to her as the “embryo 
carrier” or the “gestational carrier;”29 others prefer to describe her function as 
that of having rented her womb.30 Either way, like the ova donor, she is 
stripped of any reference to maternity; the notion that gestation entails a 
biologically interactive process, in which a particular woman is actively 
engaged and by which she not only procreates another but also subjects herself 
to modification, is elided. Moreover, in the current language of commercial 
reproduction, the attribute “parent” has been reserved for the commissioning 
parties, now denominated the “intended parents.”31 These linguistic practices 
have become so well established that they are routinely reduced to acronyms: 
“GC” denotes the gestational carrier, “IPs,” the intended parents. The 
recodification entailed is normatively freighted, implicitly indicating how one 
ought to think: It is acceptable for eggs and sperms to be transferred because 
they are donated, not sold; it is acceptable for the gestational carriers to have 
contractual rather than parental rights because they are providing a service for 
third parties; it is acceptable to restrict references to parenthood to the 
“intended parents” as the other parties involved are only providers of either 
raw materials or services (in fact, surrogacy is the vehicle whereby the 
intended parents realize their parenthood, which is what is “intended,” 
presumably, by all the parties); finally, it is acceptable for all parties to engage 
in the transaction because it is not commercial and does not reify the children 
themselves as transactional objects (they are posited as being the ultimate 
product of biological material that belonged to the commissioning parents from 
the start). 
The recodification of the processes involved in reproduction remains 
intensely contested. Nonetheless, the separation of the two female functions—
ova provision and gestation—has had an important impact on the market for 
babies. Structurally, the separation of functions is reflected in the segmentation 
of the market: distinct, specialized agencies match egg providers, sperm 
providers, and gestators with potential clients. Legally, in the United States and 
several other countries in which surrogacy is permitted, gestational surrogacy 
 
 28 Robyn Nazar, The Value of an Egg Donation, AM. FERTILITY ASS’N, http://www.theafa.org/article/the-
value-of-an-egg-donation (last visited Feb. 23, 2013). 
 29 Lauren Andrew Hudgeons, Gestational Agreements in Texas: A Brave New World, 57 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 863, 894–95 (2005). 
 30 Id. at 866. 
 31 Id. at 869. 
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has emerged as the preferred mode for commissioned births.32 In the United 
States, the advent of gestational surrogacy has also accompanied a lull, if not 
an actual calming, of polemics against surrogacy, although no unifying legal 
framework has been adopted by state legislatures and recent case law suggests 
that the enforceability of surrogacy arrangements, even when noncommercial 
and solely gestational, is far from settled.33 It seems likely that awareness that 
gestational surrogates will not transmit their physical traits to the children they 
bear has facilitated “northern” recourse to gestational services provided in the 
“global south,” further contributing to the general stratification of reproduction 
that has already been documented in reference to child-care and adoption.34 To 
put it bluntly, Caucasians wanting Caucasian children can now hire non-
Caucasian women to bear them, so long as the “genetic material” is Caucasian. 
Although empirical studies are scarce, this suggests that the market for ova and 
that for gestational carriers will evince different dynamics. Whereas in the 
 
 32 Thus, the Prefatory Comment of the U.S. Uniform Parentage Act notes: “The practice of having a 
woman perform both functions [i.e., genetic and gestational] is generally strongly disfavored by the assisted 
reproduction community. Experience has shown that the gestational mother’s genetic link to the child 
sometimes creates additional emotional and psychological problems in enforcing a gestational agreement.” 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, prefatory note (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 360 (2000). Australia (ACT), Israel, and 
India (under the as-yet unimplemented Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill 2010) are among 
the states that recognize only gestational surrogacy arrangements. Hague Conference Report 2012, note 4, at 
13 n.72, 17 n.102. Ukraine recognizes both gestational and traditional surrogacy, but in gestational surrogacy 
arrangements the intended parents are the presumptive parents of the child whereas in traditional surrogacy the 
de facto parents are the surrogate and her child. Sarah Mortazavi, It Takes a Village To Make a Child: 
Creating Guidelines for International Surrogacy, 100 GEO. L.J. 2249, 2272 (2012). 
 33 See A.G.R. v. D.R.H. & S.H., No. FD 09-001838-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 2009); 
Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109–46 (2009). 
A panel of the New Jersey Assembly has recently approved a bill that would allow the intended mother’s name 
to be registered on the birth certificate after a 72-hour waiting period. See Mary Ann Spoto, Assembly Panel 
Approves Bill Allowing Women Using Surrogates To Be Named Mother on Birth Certificate, STAR-LEDGER 
(N.J.), Mar. 3, 2012, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/03/nj_assmebly_panel_aprpoves_bil.html. 
 34 The term “stratified reproduction” was first introduced by Shellee Colen. Shellee Colen, Like a Mother 
to Them: Stratified Reproduction and West Indian Childcare Workers and Employers in New York, in 
CONCEIVING THE NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 6, at 78. Colen defines stratified reproduction to mean that 
“physical, and social reproductive tasks are accomplished differentially according to inequalities that are based 
on hierarchies of class, race, ethnicity, gender, place in a global economy and migration status and that are 
structured by social, economic and political forces. The reproductive labor . . . is differentially experienced, 
valued, and rewarded according to inequalities of access to material and social resources.” Id. at 78. In 
reference to transnational adoption Yngvesson notes: “[T]he ‘global’ dimension of motherhood is cancelled 
with an adoption decree that declares the adoptive mother to be the only mother of the child. But the official 
inivisibility of an ‘other’ mother, whether birth mother, foster mother or caretaker in a children’s home, does 
not erase the complex field of relations that produce adoptable children, or the stratification of reproduction 
that makes transnational adoption a desirable option for ‘completing’ families in European and American 
nations and for managing an ‘excess’ of children in the developing world.” Barbara Yngvesson, Transnational 
Adoption and the Transnationalization of Motherhood: Rethinking Abandonment, Adoption and Return, in 
THE GLOBALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD, supra note 6, at 106, 122. 
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former, presumptive “racial” (along with other genetic) characteristics may 
entail premium prices, in the latter such characteristics may be less important.35 
Moreover, certain countries may find their comparative advantage in exporting 
eggs, rather than in providing gestators, or vice versa.36 
This is not to suggest that there are no contextual conditions that the market 
for gestational carriers will seek—to date, wombs come in female bodies, and 
their ability to perform their labor is dependent on a variety of factors, 
minimally including the general health of the womb provider, the quality of the 
physical and social environment in which her gestational functions take place, 
her abstention from harmful practices, and the conditions of delivery.37 Indeed, 
recently published research has highlighted the importance of the gestators’ 
physiological (and genetic) characteristics on fetal development.38 Valuation of 
such factors plays a role in determining demand along with the pricing of the 
services purchased. A California surrogacy could have cost the Balazes 
between $80,000 and $120,000;39 similar services purchased in Gujarat were 
likely priced between $22,000 and $35,000;40 and in Ukraine the price tag 
might have ranged from $30,000 to $45,000.41 Given the elimination of race as 
a limiting factor, the widespread availability of the Internet and its ability to 
link potential suppliers of genetic components and gestational functions with 
demand, and the ease of international travel, the market for baby making has 
 
 35 For examples of ethnically or racially specialized egg donation agencies, see ASIAN EGG DONATION 
LLC, http://aed-web.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2013); NY LIFESPRING LLC, http://www.nylifespring.com (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2013) (Jewish egg donors). An agency that reportedly specializes in African American egg 
donors and surrogates may be found at Heart to Heart Egg Donations. HEART TO HEART EGG DONATIONS, 
http://www.fwdonoreggs.com/index.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2013). On the specialization of this agency, see 
Abbie Waters, African-American Egg Donor Program Finds Black Egg Donors, FERTILITY NATION, http:// 
www.fertilitynation.com/african-american-egg-donor-program-finds-black-egg-donors (last visited May 5, 
2013). 
 36 This is especially likely to occur if, as discussed later, particular states privilege egg donation over 
gestation in the definition of citizenship. Analogous market specialization is occurring in sperm donation. One 
British study cited Denmark as a preferred source of sperm for women seeking sperm in the United Kingdom. 
See Paul Henley, Business Booms for Danish Sperm, BBC NEWS (May 19, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
world-europe-13460455. 
 37 Douglas Almond & Janet Currie, Killing Me Softly: The Fetal Origins Hypothesis, J. ECON. PERSP., 
Summer 2011, at 153, 154. 
 38 For a review of research on the effects of nutrition and other factors relating to maternal behavior and 
health on fetal development, see id. 
 39 Stephanie Saul, Building a Baby, with Few Ground Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2009, at A1. 
 40 Andrea Whittaker, Challenges of Medical Travel to Global Regulation: A Case Study of Reproductive 
Travel in Asia, 10 GLOBAL SOC. POL. 396, 403 (2010); MED. TOURISM CORP., http://www.medicaltourismco. 
com/assisted-reproduction-fertility/low-cost-surrogacy-india.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2013). 
 41 See INT’L REPRODUCTIVE TECHS. SUPPORT AGENCY, http://www.irtsa.com.ua/en/news/363.html (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2013). 
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become global. Reproductive tourism entrepreneurs operating in numerous 
countries seek to ensure that client demands are met, competing on a 
combination of quality guarantees, ease of access, and price.42 
When, as anticipated, the surrogate mother engaged to carry the Balaz 
children gave birth, the registrar of Gujarat, Anand Nagar Palika—following 
procedures at least implicitly permitted by the National Guidelines for 
Accreditation, Supervision and Regulation of Artificial Reproductive 
Technique Clinics in India, adopted in 2002—issued birth certificates 
identifying Jan Balaz as their father.43 But surrogacy is illegal in Germany,44 
Jan Balaz was reportedly aware that the birth certificates would not be 
accepted by the consular authorities as a basis for establishing the filiation of 
the twins and hence the issuance of German passports. 
Faced with these difficulties, the Balazes sought Indian passports, turning 
to judicial procedures to do so.45 While the lower court refused to recognize 
the children as Indian for want of an Indian parent, Palika modified their birth 
certificates.46 The birth date, initially erroneously recorded as 14.1.2008, was 
corrected to 4.1.2008.47 More significantly, the name of Susan Lohle (Jan 
Balaz’s wife), who had originally been identified as the mother, was replaced 
with that of the gestational carrier.48 The passport applications identified the 
children as Balaz Nikolas and Balaz Leonard; Jan Balaz appeared as the father 
and the gestational carrier as the mother.49 The Passport Authorities entertained 
the applications and two Indian passports were issued for the twins.50 But 
shortly thereafter, Balaz received an intimation-cum-notice issued by the 
Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Regional Passport Office, 
which requested him to surrender both passports while the matter was pending 
 
 42 See Elise Smith et al., Reproductive Tourism in Argentina: Clinic Accreditation and its Implication for 
Consumers, Health Professionals and Policy Makers, 10 DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS 59, 60 (2010).  
 43 Balaz v. Anand Municipality, supra note 9, para. 3 (“Surrogate mother gave birth to two baby boys on 
4.1.2008. Petitioner then applied for registration of the birth of the children in the prescribed form to Anand 
Nagar Palika. Anand Nagar Palika issued a certificate of birth to the children as per the provisions of 
Registration of Birth and Deaths Act, 1969. Earlier date of birth was shown as 14.1.2008, which was later 
corrected as 4.1.2008 and the name of the petitioner’s wife who was shown as the mother of the babies, was 
replaced with the name of Marthaben Immanuel Khristi.”).  
 44 Id. para. 7.  
 45 The facts of the case are summarized in the proceedings of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad. 
See id. 
 46 Id. para. 3. 
 47 Id.  
 48 Id.  
 49 Id. para. 4.  
 50 Id.  
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in the High Court of Gujarat.51 On appeal, the High Court of Gujarat 
recognized the nationality right of the children: They were Indian, it held, 
because they were born on Indian soil to an Indian mother.52 The gestational 
carrier, in other words, was now the natural (and only) mother. In the Court’s 
words, “the only conclusion that is possible is that a gestational mother who 
has blood relations with the child is more deserving to be called as the natural 
mother. She has carried the embryo for full 10 months in her womb, nurtured 
the babies through the umbilical cord.”53 
The Passport Authority at Ahmedabad nonetheless refused to reissue the 
passports that the Court’s decision would have authorized. The Apex Court—
India’s highest court—was seized of the case.54 As a decision was pending, 
and deadlines set and reset, negotiations among India, Germany, and the 
Balazes accelerated and a public opinion campaign was launched.55 The Apex 
Court itself urged the Indian authorities to explore non-judicial avenues.56 
Adoption was touted as a possible pathway to establishing the children’s 
parentage.57 Press reports indicate that this solution may have been proposed 
by Germany.58 But an action that, in a German perspective, could transform 
illegality into legality by re-construing the illegally born twins into legally 
adopted children, in an Indian perspective, threatened to have the opposite 
effect. Surrogacy is not banned in India; the births were not per se illegal. 
Adoption, however, is reserved to children who are “orphan[ed], abandoned or 
surrendered.”59 Such children, whose adoptability is certified by appropriate 
state authorities, lack a parent (or have a parent who has been adjudged 
incompetent).60 Moreover, because India is a party to the Hague Convention on 
 
 51 Id.  
 52 Id. paras. 16, 17. 
 53 Id para. 16.  
 54 Germany May Give Visas to Surrogate Twins (Second Lead), THAINDIAN NEWS (Jan. 4, 2010), 
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/germany-may-give-visas-to-surrogate-twins-second-
lead_100298948.html. 
 55 See, e.g., German Twins’ Father Makes Desperate Plea, TIMES OF INDIA (Feb. 27, 2010), http://www. 
timesnow.tv/German-twins-father-makes-desperate-plea/articleshow/4339533.cms. 
 56 Government Given Time To Bend Adoption Law for German Couple, THAINDIAN NEWS (Mar. 17, 
2010), http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/government-given-time-to-bend-adoption-law-for-
german-couple_100335843.html. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See, e.g., Adoption Only Way out for Surrogate Twins: Germany, TIMES OF INDIA (Jan. 19, 2010), 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-01-19/india/28135694_1_surrogate-twins-german-couple-
susan-lohle. 
 59 See CENT. ADOPTION RES. AGENCY, GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN § 4 (2011) 
(India), available at http://adoptionindia.nic.in/guideline-family/Part_I.pdf. 
 60 See id. § 2(c), 2(v), 2(zd). 
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Intercountry Adoption (the “Adoption Convention”), all cross-border 
adoptions must comply with Convention rules, including a complementarity 
requirement—the adoption agency must certify that no adequate national 
placement of the child is possible—and a ban on pre-adoption contact between 
the birth mother and the intended adoptive parents.61 Jan Balaz, as the 
biological father of the twins whose paternity, in an Indian perspective, 
appeared uncontested, could only adopt his own children through an infraction 
of the law.62 Susan Lohle’s adoption of them was similarly compromised. 
Moreover, Indian law allows foreign parents to assume custody of Indian 
children only in a provisional guardianship arrangement.63 The parents must 
then adopt the children in their own countries within a specified time frame.64 
The Central Adoption Resource Agency, which was established pursuant to 
India’s having become a party to the Adoption Convention in 2003, and which 
exercises exclusive competence in this domain, declared the situation beyond 
its jurisdiction, as it was only concerned with issues related to abandoned 
children.65 The Apex Court ordered the agency to reconsider, albeit on the 
condition that a precedent not be created.66 The agency duly did so and issued 
a No Objection Certificate for the adoption of the children.67 Accordingly, 
when the impending expiry of Jan Balaz’s own Indian visa raised the 
possibility that the children would become wards of the state—the children 
were provided German visas (and Indian exit documents).68 In May 2010, the 
Balaz twins were provided the exit and entry documents that allowed them to 
 
 61 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption arts. 4, 
29, May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167 (entered into force May 1, 1995) [hereinafter Adoption Convention]. 
 62 But a German court has recently affirmed that paternity in surrogacy cases is attributable in the first 
instance to the husband of the woman who gives birth and not to the sperm provider or commissioning male. 
See Nisha Satkunarajah, Surrogate Child Denied German Passport, BIONEWS (May 9, 2011), http://www. 
bionews.org.uk/page_94158.asp; Surrogate Children Have No Right to German Passport, Court Rules, LOCAL 
(Apr. 28, 2011, 11:41 AM), http://www.thelocal.de/society/20110428-34681.html. 
 63 Guardianship and Ward Act, No. 8 of 1890, INDIA CODE (1993), vol. 8, §§ 6–7, 12, 17, available at 
http://www.childlineindia.org.in/Guardians-and-Wards-Act-1890.htm. 
 64 CENT. ADOPTION RES. AGENCY, supra note 59, at § 27. 
 65 SC Asks Govt To Consider German Couple Plea for Adoption of Surrogate Kids, HINDUSTAN TIMES 
(Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/newdelhi/SC-asks-Govt-to-consider-German-
couple-plea-for-adoption-of-surrogate-kids/Article1-512900.aspx. 
 66 See id. 
 67 Hari G. Ramasubramanian, CARA Agrees To Provide No Objection Certificate in the Jan Balaz Case, 
INDIAN SURROGACY L. CTR. (May 4, 2010), http://www.indiansurrogacylaw.com/blog/2010/05/cara-agrees-to-
provide-no-objection-certificate-in-the-jan-balaz-case-german-coupl., Hari G. Ramasubramanian, German 
Couple All Set To Take Twins to Homeland, INDIAN SURROGACY L. CTR. (May 29, 2010), http://www. 
indiansurrogacylaw.com/blog/tag/surrogate-mother/. 
 68 Laws on Surrogacy: German Twins Finally Granted Visa, LAWIS GREEK (May 27, 2010, 1:35 PM), 
http://www.lawisgreek.com/surrogacy-german-twins-granted-visa. 
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leave India for Germany.69 The parents agreed to adopt them in Germany 
according to German rules.70 In the meantime, the Balaz case and others like it 
may have spurred a market for false declarations of motherhood. 
Commissioning parents seeking Indian passports for their children have 
apparently been able to engage women willing to declare themselves mothers, 
thus perhaps eluding the difficulties that would be prompted by already 
identified gestational carriers making such declarations.71 
B. International Commercial Surrogacy: Filiation, Citizenship, and 
Conflicting National Legal Frameworks 
The Balaz case is part of a line of disputes that have embroiled India. In 
2008, Baby Manji—a child commissioned by a Japanese couple who divorced 
prior to her birth—had been prevented from being expatriated by the conjoined 
operation of Japanese rules that prohibit surrogacy and Indian rules that restrict 
adoption.72 Ultimately, India agreed to allow the child to be entrusted to her 
father and paternal grandmother;73 concomitantly, the Japanese authorities 
issued a special visa on humanitarian grounds, the implication again being that 
this decision was not to be regarded as setting precedent.74 More recently, a 
Canadian couple failed to obtain travel documents for twins they had 
commissioned: DNA tests required by the Canadian authorities revealed that 
neither intended parent was genetically related to one of the children, 
suggesting a medical error in the Indian fertility lab.75 Ottawa ultimately issued 
a citizenship card to the twin who is biologically related to the couple and 
travel papers to the other child, with the apparent understanding that the family 
 
 69 Surrogate Children Have No Right to German Passport, Court Rules, supra note 62. 
 70 See Dhananjay Mahapatra, German Surrogate Twins To Go Home, TIMES OF INDIA (May 27, 2010), 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-05-27/india/28279835_1_stateless-citizens-balaz-surrogate-
mother; Hari G. Ramasubramanian, German Couple All Set To Take Twins to Homeland, INDIAN SURROGACY 
L. CTR. (May 29, 2010), http://www.indiansurrogacylaw.com/blog/2010/05/german-couple-set-twins-
homeland. 
 71 Abhijit Sathe, Fake Mom of Frenchman’s Twins Nabbed, MUMBAIMIRROR.COM (Aug. 4, 2011), 
http://m.mumbaimirror.com/index.aspx?Page=article&sectname=News%20-%20Cover%20Story&sectid= 
15&contentid=20110804201108040227076607898df6. 
 72 See KARI POINTS, THE KENAN INST. FOR ETHICS AT DUKE UNIV., COMMERCIAL SURROGACY AND 
FERTILITY TOURISM IN INDIA: THE CASE OF BABY MANJI 2 (2009), available at http://www.duke.edu/web/ 
kenanethics/CaseStudies/BabyManji.pdf. 
 73 Id. at 6–7. 
 74 Surrogate Baby Born in India Arrives in Japan, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Nov. 3, 2008), http://www. 
hindustantimes.com/Surrogate-baby-born-in-India-arrives-in-Japan/Article1-348858.aspx. 
 75 Matt Wade, Babies Left in Limbo as India Struggles with Demand for Surrogacy, BRISBANE TIMES 
(May 1, 2010), http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/world/babies-left-in-limbo-as-india-struggles-with-demand-
for-surrogacy-20100430-tzbl.html. 
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would file an application on humanitarian and compassionate grounds for their 
non-biological child and then a citizenship application.76 Taken together these 
cases have highlighted a lack of legal certainty that may ultimately undermine 
the demand for Indian reproductive surrogacy services while heightening the 
financial costs associated with the risks of uncertainty. They have also revealed 
the human costs of the collisions that can occur when “exporting” and 
“importing” states pursue conflicting policies. 
India appears engaged in an ongoing review of the legal framework 
governing surrogacy.77 This process is complicated not simply by the federal 
structure of the state, but also by the role of personal law, for Indian citizens 
may be subject to the jurisdiction of communal/religious authorities in regard 
 
 76 Ravenna Aulakh, After 6 Years and Fertility Mixup, Surrogate Twin Can Come Home, TORONTO STAR 
(May 5, 2011), http://www.thestar.com/news/article/985936—after-6-years-and-fertility-mixup-surrogate-
twin-can-come-home. 
 77 Govt Proposes To Bring Bill ToRegulate Surrogacy: Azad, THE HINDU (March 19, 2013), 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/govt-proposes-to-bring-bill-to-regulate-surrogacy-azad/article45255 
57.ece. In July 2012, the Ministry of Home Affairs issued guidelines requiring foreign nationals traveling to 
India for reproductive surrogacy purposes to obtain a medical [rather than tourist] visa. The conditions for the 
issuance of such visa was made conditional upon the applicants: a) being a heterosexual married couple; b) 
being in possession of a letter from their Embassy in India or their foreign ministry stating clearly that: (i)The 
country recognizes surrogacy; (ii) The child/children to be born to the commissioning couple through the 
Indian surrogate will be permitted entry into their country as a biological child/children of the commissioning 
surrogacy; d) provide an undertaking that they would provide for the child/ren born of the surrogacy 
arrangement; c) providing a notarized agreement with the prospective Indian surrogate mother; d) obtaining 
the required services exclusively through a registered ART clinic; e) obtaining an exit permit prior to leaving 
India with the child/ren, which in turn would be conditioned on a certificate issued by the ART clinic. Andrew 
Vorzeimer, New Guidelines: India Not A Viable Option for Gay Couples, Unmarried Couples or Single 
Individuals, SPIN DOCTOR (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.eggdonor.com/blog/2013/01/04/guidelines-india-viable-
option-gay-couples-unmarried-couples-single-individuals/. Since the issuance of these guidelines, it appears 
that the government has announced a moratorium on the ban prohibiting gay and single couples leaving the 
country with the children born of surrogacy arrangements into which they had entered, so long as the children 
are born within 2013. Aloke Tikku, Gay Foreigners Can Take Home India-Born Babies, HINDUSTAN TIMES 
(MARCH 19, 2013), http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/Gay-foreigners-can-take-home-
India-born-babies/Article1-1028568.aspx. It is not clear the extent to which the Bill that will now be proposed 
reprises the previously developed Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill 2010 [hereinafter 
ART Draft Bill], available at www.icmr.nic.in/guide/ART%20REGULATION%20Draft%20Bill1.pdf. See 
also Rakesh Bhatnagar, Govt Will Enact Surrogacy Law, Says the Solicitor General, DAILY NEWS ANALYSIS 
(Jan. 21, 2010, 12:12 AM), http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_govt-will-enact-surrogacy-law-says-
solicitor-general_1337205. The bill had been finalized by the Union Health Ministry and sent to the Law 
Ministry for approval. See Trupti Shirole, Bill to Regulate Surrogacy in India, MEDINDIA (Jan. 27, 2011, 2:07 
PM), http://www.medindia.net/news/Bill-to-Regulate-Surrogacy-in-India-79993-1.htm. Moreover, the Union 
Cabinet had been reportedly in the process of examining the Bill. Apeksha Mehta, Is India Promoting 
Reproductive Tourism, MIGHTYLAWS INDIA (May 29, 2011, 10:30 AM), http://www.mightylaws.in/643/india-
promoting-reproductive-tourism.  
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to their domestic relations.78 Even more, there continues to be substantial 
debate within India regarding the desirability of legalizing surrogacy itself, and 
the conditions that ought to be imposed.79 Attempts to bring order to surrogacy 
are therefore caught between two conflicting trends: one favoring India’s 
economic use of the reproductive capacities of women in an extension of the 
health tourism that has been actively fostered; the other highlighting fears of 
exploitation, in particular in regard to women, concerns regarding the status of 
the children born of surrogacy arrangements, hetero-normative concerns 
regarding access to surrogacy services, and fundamental objections to an 
industry that can be characterized as the production of children for export.80 
Legislative reform could provide the legal certainty necessary for India to 
maintain, or even increase, its market share. But as the cases referred to above 
demonstrate, the problem is not solely that of the internal consistency and 
overall coordination of the Indian legal framework. At issue here is the 
coherence of the Indian legal system with that of the other market participants. 
The legal incompatibilities that permeate the international market for 
surrogacy are not exclusive to India. The different legal orders that crisscross 
transnational surrogacy have given rise to a host of difficult situations: children 
whose births have been registered and then de-registered (France,81 Norway82); 
children for whom domestic courts have compelled their own reluctant 
consular authorities to issue travel documents (the Netherlands83); children 
denied entry visas into the commissioning parents’ home states altogether 
(Germany); children for whom parliaments have authorized emergency 
passports as special dispensations given their own prohibitionist national 
 
 78 See Narendra Subramanian, Making Family and Nation: Hindu Marriage Law in Early Postcolonial 
India, 69 J. ASIAN STUD. 771 (2010). 
 79 See, e.g., Anil Malhotra, Legalising Surrogacy—Boon or Bane?, L. RESOURCE INDIA (July 14, 2010, 
11:54 PM), http://indialawyers.wordpress.com/2010/07/page/2; Nilanjana S. Roy, Protecting the Rights of 
Surrogate Mothers in India, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/05/world/asia/05iht-
letter05.html. For a recent discussion regarding the importance of state-level regulation of surrogacy, see, for 
example, Proposed Bill on Surrogacy Is Not Adequate: Experts, DNA (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.dnaindia. 
com/india/report_proposed-bill-on-surrogacy-is-not-adequate-experts_1597271; K. Srivastava, Surrogacy 
Mothers Need To Be Protected, DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS (Dec. 18, 2011, 8:00 PM), http://www.dnaindia. 
com/mumbai/report_surrogate-mothers-need-to-be-protected_1627181.  
 80 See, e.g., DasGupta & DasGupta, supra note 21. 
 81 France Rules Against Children of Surrogate Mothers, CNS NEWS (Apr. 6, 2011), available at http:// 
www.cnsnews.com/news/article/france-rules-against-children-surrogate-mothers; see also Cour de cassation 
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], 1e civ., Apr. 6, 2011, Bull. civ. I, No. 72 (Fr.). 
 82 Dutch Consulate Over-Ruled in India IVF Case, RADIO NETH. WORLDWIDE (Jan. 12, 2011), 
http://www.rnw.nl/english/bulletin/dutch-consulate-overruled-india-ivf-case. 
 83 See France Rules Against Children of Surrogate Mothers, supra note 81. 
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policies (Iceland84); children whose filiation has been impugned although 
ultimately vindicated (Italy85); children “legalized” by judges in knowing 
tension with the objectives of national legislation (U.K.86); children virtually 
sequestered inside homes unable to obtain basic medical services because they 
lack a legal identity (Ireland87); children with two actual parents but only one 
(or no) legally cognizable parent.88 Such incompatibilities have led to a variety 
of responses. States have taken emergency measures, stressing that such 
measures are not intended to set precedents.89 Domestic courts have compelled 
their national administrations to resolve individual cases, often stressing that 
the solutions cannot be considered precedential.90And second-generation 
legislation has been proposed in France,91 Ukraine,92 Finland,93 Kyrgyzstan,94 
Ireland,95 and the Netherlands96 to address the problems created by current law. 
 
 84 Susamma Kurian, Iceland Accepts Surrogate Baby Born in Thane, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Dec. 21, 2010), 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/Maharashtra/Iceland-accepts-surrogate-baby-born-in-Thane/ 
Article1-640934.aspx. 
 85 Francesca Giulani, Doria Pamhilj, l’ultima Dinasty: “Il Principe, il compagno e 2 figli,” LA 
REPUBBLICA (Mar. 13, 2012), http://roma.repubblica.it/cronaca/2011/01/25/news/la_storia_doria_pamphilj_ 
lultima_dinasty_il_principe_il_compagno_e_2_figli-11657574. 
 86 The BBC explained:  
Laws in the UK are designed to try to prevent such [commercial surrogacy] 
arrangements. . . . [H]e has agreed to give retrospective approval for commercial surrogacy on at 
least four occasions. “The statute does give power to the High Court retrospectively to authorize 
these payments and the reason we do so is not because we want to encourage commercial 
surrogacy but because of the impossible position which the child born as a result of the 
arrangement finds themselves in when they’re back in this country.” 
High Court Judge Approves Commercial Surrogacy, BBC NEWS (May 19, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
uk-13452330 (quoting High Court Justice Hedley). 
 87 Surrogacy: The Babies Born into Legal Limbo, IRISH TIMES ( Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.irishtimes. 
com/newspaper/features/2011/1122/1224307943752.html. 
 88 See Hague Conference Report 2012, supra note 4, para. 35. 
 89 See, e.g., Sénat, Proposition de loi n. 234, Tendant à autoriser et encadrer la gestation pour autrui, 
Session Ordinaire 2009-2010 (Fr.), available at http://www.senat.fr/leg/ppl09-234.html. 
 90 See, e.g., Surrogate Baby Born in India Arrives in Japan, supra note 74. 
 91 Sénat, Proposition de loi n. 234. A broad-based campaign is underway, however, to maintain the 
prohibition of surrogacy. See La gestation pour autrui: une extension du domaine de l’alientation!, LE 
MONDE, Feb. 2, 2011, http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2011/02/08/la-gestation-pour-autrui-une-extension-
du-domaine-de-l-alienation_1476850_3232.html. 
 92 Anna Lelyuk, Ukrainian Surrogacy Laws, HG.ORG (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id= 
28807. 
 93 Finland Opens Door to Surrogacy, YLE UUTISET (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.yle.fi/uutiset/news/ 
2011/09/finland_opens_door_to_surrogacy_2894510.html. 
 94 Julia Mazykina, Kyrgyzstan to Legalize Commercial Surrogate Maternity, 24.KG (July 4, 2011, 1:53 
PM), http://eng.24.kg/community/2011/04/07/17401.html. 
 95 Carl O’Brien, Surrogacy Guidelines To Be Issued Next Month, IRISH TIMES (Nov. 23, 2011), available 
at 2011 WLNR 24227446. 
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None of the proposed solutions, however, can successfully reconcile the 
discrepant national frameworks in play. 
Surrogacy in one state is the solution some jurisdictions have chosen.97 A 
court in South Africa has ruled that foreigners wishing to employ a surrogate 
must intend to live in South Africa on a long-term basis, a decision that 
coheres with South Africa’s tight regulations on foreigners wishing to adopt 
South African children: Prospective parents are also required to demonstrate 
that they will settle in the country.98 Commercial surrogacy is banned in most 
Australian states; in addition, several states have made it a punishable offence 
(including by imprisonment) for their residents to enter into commercial 
surrogacy arrangements overseas.99 The dimensions and growth of the market 
for babies suggest that autarky in surrogacy is doomed to repeat the history of 
all autarky: regulatory failure, soaring transaction costs and externalities 
associated with growing illegality, and, ultimately, combined international and 
internal pressure for rule revision. 
States opting for national closure are more likely to be importers of 
children rather than exporters. An ad for a Ukrainian surrogacy agency noted, 
“All the activities of the [S]urrogacy agency are approved by the Ministry of 
Justice of Ukraine, Administration of Justice in Kharkov Region and State 
Committee of Ukraine for Regulatory Policy and Entrepreneurship, [and] 
Ministry of Health of Ukraine.”100 Despite these assurances, a French couple 
was recently arrested smuggling their commissioned children, hidden under a 
mattress in a van, from Ukraine to Hungary.101 The couple declared that they 
were reacting to France’s refusal to recognize the children’s filiation and, 
therefore, to issue identity documents.102 They subsequently appealed to “any 
 
 96 Maike Winters, Commercial Surrogacy: A Sign of the Times?, RADIO NETH. WORLDWIDE (Feb. 17, 
2012), http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/commercial-surrogacy-a-sign-times. 
 97 States that impose domiciliary requirements include Greece (both the commissioning mother and the 
gestational carrier must be domiciled in Greece), Australia (where surrogacy is legal), South Africa and the 
United Kingdom (one or both commissioning parties must be domiciled in the United Kingdom at the time of 
application for a parentage order). Hague Conference Report 2012, supra note 4, at 14 n.91. 
 98 See SA Tightens Rules for Foreigners To Make Families, NEW AGE (Oct. 13, 2011, 7:11 AM), 
http://www.thenewage.co.za/31768-1007-53-SA_tightens_rules_for_foreigners_to_make_families. 
 99 Dep’t of Immigration and Citizenship, Fact Sheet 36a—International Surrogacy Arrangements, 
http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/36a_surrogacy.htm (last visited May 5, 2013). 
 100 Surrogacy Agency, LA VITA FELICE, http://surrogate-mothers.ru/uk/surrogacy/surrogate_motherhood_ 
center.html (last visited May 5, 2013). 
 101 French Family Arrested for Smuggling Babies out of Ukraine, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 25, 2011), http:// 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/8405618/French-family-arrested-for-smuggling-babies-
out-of-Ukraine.html. 
 102 Id. 
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nation out there [that] can give our little girls citizenship so that we can finally 
take them home.”103 As with the Balaz twins, such dramas demonstrate that 
regulatory support in the exporting country alone is not enough.  
India appears to be taking a very different approach as the visa 
requirements included in India’s 2012 guidelines—which echo the proposal set 
forth in the 2010 Assisted Reproductive Technologies Bill—demonstrate. 
Rather than prohibiting international exchanges, it is seeking to impose a 
system of compulsory international coordination and to shift part of the cost of 
ensuring such coordination to its foreign clients.104 Prior to establishing a 
legally valid arrangement with a surrogate, foreign commissioning parties now 
are required to provide documentation attesting to their own national 
authorities’ recognition of the legality of surrogacy and corresponding ability 
to issue citizenship papers to the children who might be born.105 This approach 
aims to avoid the types of problems that arose in the Balaz case. It also 
implicitly fosters the emergence of pressure groups of prospective 
commissioning parents.106 Rather than simply accept their own countries’ 
prohibitionist stances, prospective commissioning parents will likely mobilize 
to promote reform; India’s new law will then have elicited the emergence of 
those “norm entrepreneurs” whom political scientists invoke to explain the 
genesis of social movements that issue in legal change.107 Thus, faced with 
Germany’s intransigence, German potential clients for Indian surrogate 
services may join forces to lobby for a change in policies that would ultimately 
lead to the issuance of the certification that India may henceforth require. 
 
 103 French Couple Issues Appeal in Surrogacy Case, SIFY (April 10, 2011), http://www.sify.com/news/ 
french-couple-issues-appeal-in-surrogacy-case-news-offbeat-lekuEddfdjc.html. 
 104 Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill § 34(19) (2010) (India) (“[T]he party seeking 
the surrogacy must ensure and establish to the assisted reproductive technology clinic through proper 
documentation (a letter from either the embassy of the Country in India or from the foreign ministry of the 
Country, clearly and unambiguously stating that (a) the country permits surrogacy, and (b) the child born 
through surrogacy in India, will be permitted entry in the Country as a biological child of the commissioning 
couple/individual) that the party would be able to take the child/children born through surrogacy, including 
where the embryo was a consequence of donation of an oocyte or sperm, outside of India to the country of the 
party’s origin or residence as the case may be.”). 
 105 Id. 
 106 As Theodore Lowi wrote, “policies determine politics.” Theodor J. Lowi, Four Systems of Policy, 
Politics, and Choice, 32 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 298, 299 (1972). With respect to the interactive relationship of 
social mobilization to international law and policy, see BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009). 
 107 The concept of “norm entrepreneurs” has given rise to a vast literature. See MARGARET E. KECK & 
KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
(1998); Kathryn Sikkink & Martha Finnemore, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 54 INT’L 
ORG. 891 (1998). 
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Indeed, in France, which has also adopted a prohibitionist stance, a movement 
seeking reform has gathered strength in part as a result of high-profile legal 
cases.108 Two proposals are before the French Senate—one presented by each 
leading political force—that would allow for the recognition of the parentage 
of children born through surrogacy, but a forceful movement has also emerged 
in opposition of any such legalization.109 
But can one exporter’s attempts at compulsory coordination succeed? Or 
will it simply provide the impetus for the development of a more lucrative and 
more exploitative—albeit narrower—clandestine market? Every request for 
certification, every increase in regulatory power, simultaneously represents an 
attempt to bring agreed-upon rules to bear on a transaction and an opportunity 
for gatekeepers to pervert the exercise of public power into private gain. 
Markets in people or body parts, like those regarding sex workers, illustrate the 
risk that prohibition, especially when accompanied by criminal sanctions, may 
simultaneously enhance the role of entrepreneurs and state functionaries 
willing to engage in illicit activities and increase the exploitation of the actual 
service providers as well as the prices their clients pay.110 
Demands for compulsory coordination from exporting states may prompt 
the formation of international coalitions. If lobbies in Germany and Japan, for 
example, seek to change their governments’ policies, they may join their 
efforts—all the more readily if they can find (or found) an international NGO 
to help support their claims. If such lobbies coordinate among themselves and 
with local groups in India, they may then lead to a transnational social 
movement. They will likely confront equally organized international 
opposition: The Catholic Church, for example, which is well positioned to 
mobilize across borders and to exert international pressure, has repeatedly 
issued pronouncements against the legalization of surrogacy and could easily 
choose to engage in a battle against surrogacy similar to that long undertaken 
against legalized abortion.111 International organizations in concert with some 
states are now attempting to address the question of surrogacy.112 As was 
 
 108 France: Surrogacy Ban Affirmed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2011, at A7. 
 109 See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], 1e civ., Apr. 6, 2011, Bull. civ. I, 
No. 72 (Fr.). 
 110 For a useful collection of essays regarding sex work, see DEMANDING SEX: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON 
THE REGULATION OF PROSTITUTION (Vanessa E. Munro & Marina Della Giusta eds., 2008).  
 111 See, e.g., Kerala Church Looks To Scupper Surrogacy Bill, CRIB (June 30, 2010), http://www. 
religiousindia.org/church-in-india/kerala-church-looks-to-scupper-surrogacy-bill. 
 112 See infra Part III. 
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portended by the Adoption Convention,113 filiation norms have become a 
matter for international coordination, and, hence, international law. 
II. CONTRACT, FILIATION, AND THE LIMITS OF CHOICE 
Some have argued that the answer to the filiation crisis that surrogacy has 
heightened lies in the application of an intent-based paradigm of parentage.114 
Under this approach, legislators protect, and courts enforce, the intentions of 
the parties embedded in their contracts. It may be that dramas like that of the 
Balaz twins would be avoided if all states were to recognize private contracts 
regarding reproduction. States would then accept whatever filiation rules and 
the corresponding attributions of maternity and paternity private parties 
negotiated, and apply their citizenship and immigration rules on that basis. Had 
Germany adopted such a stance, it could have averted the near catastrophe by 
basing recognition of the original birth certificate, and the consequent issuance 
of German passports to the twins, on the Balazes’ bargain with the gestational 
carrier. This legal posture would have been acceptable to India, but it 
contravened Germany’s policy on reproduction and filiation, leading to the 
refusal to recognize a parental nexus between the Balazes and the twins and 
thus to the rejection of the request for German identity papers on which entry 
rights into Germany could have been based. Many states have refused to 
recognize intent, without more, as a basis for the establishment of filiation115—
and predictably will continue to do so. 
Conflicts among legal frameworks impede the flow of children and parents 
from the states in which the genetic components are extracted and assembled 
and in which births take place to those of the newly constituted family’s 
 
 113 Adoption Convention, supra note 61. 
 114 For a recent argument for the intent-based test of parentage, see Linda S. Anderson, Adding Players to 
the Game: Parentage Determinations When Assisted Reproductive Technology Is Used To Create Families, 62 
ARK. L. REV. 29 (2009). The intent-based test was first articulated in Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 
1993). The court, required to attribute maternity to the gestational carrier or the commissioning mother (who 
was also the ova-provider) or to neither (as the lower court had done): 
conclude[d] that although the Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity and giving birth as 
means of establishing a mother and child relationship, when the two means do not coincide in 
one woman, she who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who intended to bring about the 
birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own—is the natural mother under California law. 
851 P.2d at 782. On intent-based private ordering of parenthood, inter alia, see generally Marjorie Maguire 
Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 
WIS. L. REV. 297. 
 115 Shultz, supra note 114, at 326–27. 
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intended residence. Incompatible norms complicate or foreclose altogether the 
recognition of parental statuses on which rights to transmit citizenship—and 
hence to obtain identity documents and international exit and entry rights—are 
predicated. The issue of filiation as it relates to definitions of maternity and 
paternity constitutes the fundamental stumbling block. While concerns about 
commodification—often raised in debates over reproductive surrogacy—may 
underlie filiation laws and policies, it is the rules regarding states’ recognition 
of the nexus between particular children and particular parents that govern the 
attribution of nationality and citizenship.116 Thus, the viability of solutions 
predicated on contractual autonomy with respect to the legal identification of a 
“mother,” “father,” or “child” is a function of the frameworks regulating 
filiation that operate both at the national and international level. 
Two normative and/or legal models condition the feasibility of privatized 
solutions to filiation: One revolves around contractual autonomy and the other 
around the public interest. The discussion below is only intended to render 
each model in ideal-typical terms; many intermediate positions have been 
espoused by advocates and policy makers, and no one state’s policies conform 
in every respect to either model. In political and philosophical debates each 
model is tempered by limiting considerations: contractual autonomy, and the 
“market liberalism” it recalls, by concerns for the harm of others; the public 
interest, and the “communitarianism” with which I will associate it here, by 
concerns for individual liberty. Nonetheless, the discussion of these models 
allows the identification of the policy elements, domestically and 
internationally, that would be required if contractual autonomy were indeed to 
be promoted as the solution to the dramatic scenarios that have involved the 
Balaz twins and many other children caught between borders. 
A. Contractual Autonomy 
1. Self-Determination and the Rights of Sellers and Buyers: What Is Bought 
and Sold? 
Arguments in favor of contractual autonomy focus on rights to self-
determination and to freedom of contract, particularly of the women 
 
 116 On the commodification debate, see generally RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS 
IN LAW AND CULTURE (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005). For a discussion of the growing 
role of private actors in international law, see generally Paul D. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 
VA. L. REV. 1573 (2011). 
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involved.117 Fewer polemics and legal strictures have focused on men selling 
sperm, and, indeed, regulation is differentiated by gender.118 If a woman wants 
to sell her ova or her services as a gestator, why should she be prevented from 
doing so? And if a buyer is willing to meet the seller’s terms, why not allow 
the transaction to occur? The prohibition of such exchanges does not stop 
them, it can be argued, but raises their transaction costs and negative 
externalities. The implicit argument is that a person’s right to dispose of 
herself—and hence of her bodily parts and bodily services—is neither 
legitimately nor effectively subject to governmental control.119 
This argument rests on three premises. First, the objects exchanged are 
characterized as pertaining directly to the ova (and sperm) provider or to the 
gestator—their bodily products and her services and/or her rights in the child 
she will bear—rather than to the child itself. Specifically, the exchange with 
the gestator is not characterized as constituting a market in human beings—
”baby-selling”—but as establishing a market in the rights a person has to her 
body products and labor and to “own” her own rights. Second, this 
configuration of the exchange between the gestator and the provider of the ova 
and sperm, on one side, and the commissioning parties on the other, situates 
the transaction squarely within the decision-making ambit of protagonists 
capable of consent. The child—already elided as an object of the exchange—is 
also elided as a subject of the exchange. There is, therefore, no need to 
“represent” the interests of the child, for example through a state-appointed 
guardian. Finally, the relevant transactions take place prior to conception, such 
that—once acquired—the constitutive parts of the embryo, the resulting 
embryo, and the fetus whose existence is predicated on the embryo and that is, 
in turn, the predicate of the child, are always already property of the 
commissioning parties. 
The future child is postulated as being nothing other than the mechanical 
result of the transformative processes that are set in motion from the moment 
that the “genetic material” is acquired to that in which the embryo develops 
and on through fetal evolution. Body parts, pre-embryo, embryo, and fetus are 
endowed with an identity that is separate from that of the gestator and is 
 
 117 See Rene Almeling, Gender and the Value of Bodily Goods: Commodification in Egg and Sperm 
Donation, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2009, at 37. 
 118 See id. at 37. 
 119 For an argument in favor of a free market in reproduction, see generally CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH 
POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY (1989). 
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marked as property of the commissioning parties.120 The gestator provides 
gestation as a service, but she has no direct ownership, parental affiliation, or 
identity interest in the embryo/fetus—which therefore cannot be 
conceptualized as an element of her body, let alone her “self”—nor, hence, can 
she have the sort of parental/maternal interest in the child that might have 
resulted from her having had an original interest in the elements and processes 
through which the child was formed. To the extent the gestator has property 
rights at all, these are characterized as “immovable,” her uterus being equated 
with any other form of real estate.121 Consequently, decisions regarding the 
disposition of the “movable” property constituted by the embryo or fetus (or, 
eventual child), whether pre- or post-delivery, are simply not hers to make. It is 
these premises that enable the surrogacy contract to be described as engaging 
parties able to consent to the goods exchanged and services performed and as 
revolving around fully alienable goods and services.122 
The argument for contractual autonomy resonates with the “possessive 
individualism” that Macpherson attributed to modern political philosophers 
and that feminist theorists have at times critiqued and at other times 
endorsed.123 Indeed, Macpherson’s definition of possessive individualism 
highlights the distinction between the individual’s property in “his own 
person,” which he possesses but may not exchange, and his property in his 
capacity to labor, which he may alienate—a distinction that maps onto the 
notion that reproductive surrogacy entails the exchange of money (or other 
benefits) for the work of gestation rather than payment for pregnancy, which 
could be viewed as a state of being and a moment (if not element) of (female) 
 
 120 Differently, the commissioning parties would have to be posited as having a property interest in the 
body of the gestator, which, given the unseverability of the (living) body from the “person,” would be contrary 
to the basic tenets of possessive individualism. It should be noted that this implied theory of surrogacy runs 
directly counter to theories underlying the legalization of abortion, which hold that for at least a certain period 
of time, the embryo and developing fetus are a part of the body of the woman and hence cannot be attributed 
an identity separable from hers on which legal rights—and a state interest in their protection—can be 
predicated. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973) (“The Constitution does not define ‘person’ in so 
many words. . . . [T]he use of the word is such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any 
assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application.”). 
 121 See 44B AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 159 (2012) (on immovable property). 
 122 These premises constitute the implicit representations of a surrogacy contract. For an in-depth analysis 
of the contractual issues raised by reproductive surrogacy, see Carol Sanger, (Baby) M Is for Many Things: 
Why I Start with Baby M, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1443 (2000).  
 123 C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 263–
77 (1962). For a critical feminist analysis, see generally CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988). 
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personhood.124 Ultimately, this argument for contractual autonomy places the 
burden of justification on those who seek to maintain or impose regulation 
rather than on those who press to abolish it.125 Precisely because its central 
concept is that of the autonomous evaluation of interests, it tends to view 
relations among persons through the prism of individual choice. And, through 
the concept of individual choice, it presents itself as a human rights argument, 
as a close relation to the argument that individual self-determination as 
explicated through individual choice is a hallmark of individual autonomy, 
empowerment, and human dignity and, hence, the keystone of civil and 
political rights.126 
At its starkest, this view leads to the conclusion that not only is the 
assumption of parental roles a matter for individual determination, but the 
contents of such roles—their correlative behavioral commitments—are also 
subject to individual choice.127 Neither giving birth nor contributing ova or 
sperm need automatically correlate with maternity or paternity as socially-
understood and legally-prescribed roles. Individual contracts for reproductive 
services can—indeed must—include enforceable clauses allocating parental 
 
 124 In his summary of the basic elements of the theory of possessive individualism, Macpherson includes 
these: “(iii) The individual is essentially the proprietor of his own person and capacities, for which he owes 
nothing to society;” and “(iv) [a]lthough the individual cannot alienate the whole of his property in his own 
person, he may alienate his capacity to labour.” MACPHERSON, supra note 123, at 263–64. 
 125 For a paradigmatic statement of this point of view, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND 
UTOPIA (1974). In the terms used by Landes and Posner with respect to governmental regulation of 
“nonmarket behavior”: “Nor is there any basis for a presumption that government does a good job of 
regulating nonmarket behavior; if anything, the negative presumption created by numerous studies of 
economic regulation should carry over to the nonmarket sphere.” Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
The Economics of the Baby Shortage, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND 
CULTURE, supra note 116, at 46, 46 (footnotes omitted). 
 126 On individual self-determination as an emerging norm in international law and central tenet of human 
rights, see THOMAS FRANCK, THE EMPOWERED SELF: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM 
(1999). See generally STEFANO RODOTÀ, LA VITA E LE REGOLE: TRA DIRITTO E NON DIRITTO (2009). See also 
the discussion of dignity as autonomy, infra Part II.B. 
 127 Some commentators limit the alienability of parental rights by noting that only that which already 
pertains to such rights—and not that which is excluded, either by necessary implication or by explicit 
regulation—may be exchanged. See, e.g., Donald J. Boudreaux, A Modest Proposal to Deregulate Infant 
Adoptions, 15 CATO J. 117, 118 (1995) (“When a birth mother gives a child up for adoption, she legally 
transfers her parental rights to the adoptive parents; the adoptive parents gain all those rights, but only those 
rights, that the birth mother possessed before the adoption.”). In the case of surrogacy, a gestational carrier 
would be able to sell her rights to being a “mother” but not the ability to define the rights and obligations 
associated with being the legal status of a “mother,” since such rights and obligations may be separately 
regulated. It is worth noting that Boudreaux begins from the assumption that “mother rights” vest in the 
woman who will (or has) given birth, and that it is she who contracts them away. Id. at 117. In a purely 
contractarian universe, however, no such default allocation would be assumed; each birth would raise anew the 
question of who, if anyone, is the mother. 
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status (one might think of these as “parentality clauses”) as well as other 
conditions directly relating to the constitution of the embryo, its implantation, 
the conduct of the gestation, and the delivery and transfer of the child and to 
conflict resolution (including, for example, with respect to jurisdiction and 
choice of law).128 Whatever agreement is reached is dispositive; state policies 
are limited to ensuring the enforcement of the will of the parties. 
2. Translating Contractual Autonomy into the Regulation of Filiation 
Translated into practice, this means that similarly situated parties can 
engage in domestic or trans-border transactions on vastly differing terms. One 
contract might specify that the gestator is the “mother” at birth, provide for her 
to relinquish her maternal status within a given period in favor of a 
commissioning party (with or without the possibility of the gestator changing 
her mind), and establish that two birth certificates be issued, an “original” and 
an “amended” one; the latter would be valid for all governmentally required 
purposes, but the former would be preserved in a public register and rendered 
accessible on the basis of agreed terms (for example, only to the children born 
of the particular agreement or their legal representatives so as to ensure that 
such children may know the identities of their biological procreators).129 
Another contract might attribute maternal status to a commissioning party from 
a particular moment of gestation or delivery while specifying that the gestator 
is not to be considered the “mother” at all, make provision for only one birth 
certificate, not allow the gestator to change her mind, and not allow access to 
any identifying information regarding the gestator or the sperm and ova 
donors. And a third contract might make provision for two contractually 
recognized and formally denominated mothers, each with specified rights and 
 
 128 Recognition of parentality clauses could be seen as a further elaboration of the theory of functionally 
based parenthood, which is predicated on the agreement of a legal parent with either an intended parent (i.e., a 
person having an “intent to parent,” and the intention has been reached in, and sanctioned by, agreement with 
the legal parent) or a “de facto” functional parent (a person whose parent has, for a specified period of time 
and with an intent to form a parent-child relationship, actually performed care-taking tasks to an extent at least 
as significant as those performed by the legal parent). For a review of the literature regarding functional 
parenthood, see Brief for Family Law Academics as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Debra H. v. Janice 
R., 14 N.Y. 3d 576 (2010) (No.10-441) (discussing, inter alia, AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002)). For a discussion that situates functional 
parenthood in the context of international legal norms, see Brief for Columbia Law School Sexuality and 
Gender Law Clinic as Amicus Curiae, In re AAR, 2013 TSPR 16 (P.R. 2013) (No. CC-2008-1010), available 
at http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/download?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=164313. 
 129 Many permutations of rights and obligations are possible with respect to access to information, on a 
spectrum that ranges from full and public access to the specific identities of the biological parents to restricted 
access to limited information, for example regarding particular genetic diseases.  
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obligations: for example, assigning one custodial rights and the ability to 
decide on education while granting the other visitation rights and the ability to 
claim a child deduction for tax purposes, receive a child allowance, or access 
reserved social services. Similarly, rights and obligations associated with 
paternity could be distributed, for example, between the sperm provider, the 
partner of the gestator, or one of the commissioning parties. Moreover, 
attributions of gendered parental roles could be made independently of the sex 
of the person thus identified, or simply subsumed in the general category of 
“parent.”130 Thus, parental status could be allocated independently of role in 
the process of reproduction, “fractionalized” or pluralized—a situation that is 
becoming more frequent although it is often fraught with difficulties and 
paradoxes because “pure contractual” models in which state action merely 
registers the intent of the parties without reflecting any substantive norms is 
hard (if not impossible) to find.131 And yet state action is precisely what is at 
issue, for private arrangements regarding filiation are designed to convey rights 
whose recognition and enforceability cannot simply be ensured by the 
individual parties to the agreements or by any self-policing parental or other 
associations they may form. Any agreement among the parties requires the 
state to inscribe particular individuals on birth certificates, to distribute 
financial benefits, to enforce decisions made by one person rather than another 
with respect to habitation, education, medical and public services, and religious 
affiliation, and to recognize applicable jus sanguinis rules with respect to 
nationality and citizenship. 
If the parties’ states of citizenship (or residency) or the forum within which 
the contract were “performed” (a term that, in this perspective, would itself be 
subject to contractual definition) were to recognize individual autonomy in 
questions relating to the attribution of parental status, all contracts would be 
equally valid and cognizable by each state’s courts and states would be 
required to act accordingly. This model, then, depends on a registrar-state that 
merely records and acts upon the parties’ decisions regarding filiation and 
parental rights and obligations. Such a state identifies its normative orientation 
and interests with respect for private preferences. And it understands that when 
transnational arrangements are involved, the role of international law is merely 
 
 130 But many states differentiate between benefits and legal presumptions applicable to mothers and 
fathers, and hence the attribution of the status of “mother” or “father” continues to matter. See, e.g., Matthew 
M. Stevenson et al., Fathers, Divorce, and Child Custody, in HANDBOOK OF FATHER INVOLVEMENT: 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 379, 379 (Natasha J. Cabrera et al. eds., 2d ed. 2013). 
 131 See Chiara Saraceno, Verso il 2000: la pluralizzazione delle esperienze e delle figure materne, in 
STORIA DELLA MATERNITÀ 318, 318–20 (Marina D’Amelia ed., 1997). 
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to facilitate the recognition of such preferences across borders.132 Further, at 
least for purposes of these agreements, under the contractual autonomy model 
both international and municipal law are required to remain silent as to 
substantive norms regarding filiation, the assignment of parental identities, and 
their attendant rights and responsibilities, as well as with respect to the 
conditions directly pertaining to the performance of the reproductive services, 
and the transfer of the end product, that is, the child. Norms that either national 
law or international agreements and customary international law detail on these 
issues are, in effect, suspended. The function of private international law, 
moreover, revolves around the application of contractual arrangements and 
does not, for example, extend to questioning a particular court’s jurisdiction so 
long as that jurisdiction has been agreed to contractually. Analogously, it does 
not allow for exceptions based on public policy or bonnes moeurs that have 
traditionally limited a state’s responsibility to recognize acts (including private 
contracts) of another state.133 This last prohibition, however, runs directly 
contrary to numerous cases involving surrogacy in which states have invoked 
public policy exceptions to refuse recognition of births (and birth certificates) 
resulting from surrogacy arrangements.134 
B. Communitarian Perspectives 
At the other end of the spectrum lie theories that assign a central role in 
defining individual choices—and individual identities—to institutions 
representing a “general good.”135 Such theories may be grounded in differing 
values: the primacy of order, for example, or of economic efficiency, or of 
 
 132 This, as Horatia Muir Watt rightly notes, is not what is entailed under the rubric of private “party 
autonomy,” which in fact establishes the ability of a party in one jurisdiction to submit a particular transaction 
to the rules of another jurisdiction, not to compose her own or avoid state regulation altogether. See Horatia 
Muir Watt, International Contracts: From the Makings of a Myth to the Requirements of Global Governance, 
6 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 250, 258–59 (2010). 
 133 For a comparative analysis of the use of international and constitutional law and public policy 
exceptions to private party contracts, see generally PARTY AUTONOMY: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW LIMITS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (George Bermann ed., 2005). For a discussion of the normative 
convergence of private and public international law that belies the notion that private international law embeds 
no value orientations, see generally ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2009). 
 134 See Hague Conference Report 2012, supra note 4, at 21 n.125 (detailing cases involving public policy 
exceptions in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Japan, and Spain). 
 135 See Ethics at a Glance: Communitarian Ethics, REGIS U. RUECKERT-HARTMAN SCH. FOR HEALTH 
PROFESSIONS, http://rhchp.regis.edu/HCE/EthicsAtAGlance/CommunitarianEthics/CommunitarianEthics.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2013) (“Strengths of the communitarian perspective include the emphasis on . . . sacrifice 
for the greater good as a measure of character.”). 
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continuity with the past. Here I will focus on “communitarian” theories, for 
they contrast most sharply with the individualism that informs the contractual 
autonomy model and they continue to function as a source of legitimation of 
public policy. 
Before proceeding, it is important to reiterate that I am outlining a model, 
not describing actual historical processes. I am not asserting that any given 
community has articulated a unitary view of the general good, nor that such a 
community as organized and governed by a central political authority (a state) 
does or has represented an uninflected “general good” that effectively equates 
with a similarly uninflected “collective interest,” nor again that such a “general 
good” must contain any particular values such as justice, liberty, and equality. I 
use “communitarianism” as a generic term to represent theories that allocate 
the capacity to elaborate shared values to the community, identify the well-
being of the community with an idealized vision of itself that such values are 
meant to instantiate, and further identify the well-being of the individual with 
the well-being of the community. 
For communitarians thus understood, the general good aligns the collective 
interest in a particular social order with the individual interest in its realization. 
The common vision of the general good represents an alchemical abstraction of 
particular visions, just as the collective interest represents an abstraction of 
more particular interests. That interactive processes of definition and 
transformation link the general and the particular does not undermine this 
proposition, for communitarians will at least implicitly assume that a working 
definition of the general good will emerge from—and be transformed by—
debate, negotiation, and implementation. Such processes may privilege the 
fulfillment of specific social functions, such as reproductive activity or 
industrial production, and the promotion or protection of specific actors, such 
as mothers, children, soldiers, or workers. 
The fundamental interdependence of individuals, the very constitution of 
individuals as socially-situated persons, is taken as legitimating a collective 
interest in their ways of being, the modalities of their interactions, and the 
kinds of choices that are available to them.136 Legal limits on individual choice 
 
 136 Thus Michael Sandel, critiquing John Rawls’ view of the self, notes: “[A] self so thoroughly 
independent as this . . . rules out the possibility of a public life in which, for good or ill, the identity as well as 
the interests of the participants could be at stake.” MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF 
JUSTICE 62 (1998). Sandel then explicates his view of inter-subjective and intra-subjective conceptions of the 
self. See id. 
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constitute legitimate exercises of power when they emanate from authoritative 
decision-making processes that are expressive of the general good. While 
individual choice operates within societal parameters, private negotiation 
rightly occurs in the “shadow of the law.”137 Consequently, struggles over 
regulatory authority concern not the legitimacy of regulation per se but the 
legitimacy of the normative perspectives that regulation expresses and 
supports. The burden of justification shifts from arguments for and against 
state intervention to arguments regarding its qualities: the objectives it pursues, 
the incentives it creates, the social categories it favors or penalizes—
ultimately, the vision of the general good that it promotes. 
1. Communitarianism and Human Dignity: Reframing Self-Determination 
Like the contractual autonomy model, the communitarian model presents 
itself as a human rights argument. At one level, the communitarian argument 
revolves around a version of group rights: the primacy of the general good, as 
defined through shared normative frameworks, authorizes the community to 
limit the parameters of individual choices.138 But the communitarian argument 
can also be configured in terms more closely resonant with the human rights of 
individuals, particularly by reference to human dignity. Dignity figures in the 
preambles of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (as well as several of its articles), is generally ascribed a 
foundational status in UN human rights treaties, constitutes a central element 
of European and Latin American human rights law and jurisprudence, and has 
acquired salience in the United States.139 
 
 137 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 
88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979) (describing negotiations in the “shadow of the law”). 
 138 See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 27(2), June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 1520 U.N.T.S . 217, 251 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986). 
 139 U.N. Charter, pmbl.; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, pmbl., U.N. 
Doc.A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights]. The first chapter of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 9 [hereinafter Charter of 
Fundamental Rights], is titled “Dignity.” It opens with Article 1, “Human dignity,” which simply states: 
“Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.” Id. The European Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine prominently features the need to ensure respect for human dignity. European 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, pmbl., art. 1, opened for signature April 4, 1997, E.T.S. 164. 
Article 1 posits the Purpose and Object of the Convention as entailing the responsibility of Parties to “protect 
the dignity and identity of all human beings . . . .” Id. art. 1. The European Court of Human Rights considers 
dignity as the foundation of all European Convention rights. See Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. 
Human Rights 155, 194 (2002) (“The very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human 
freedom.”). See generally Christopher M. McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655 (2008) (reviewing dignity and its interpretation in contemporary international 
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Although it is primarily through the mobilization of Christian theologians 
and political figures that the concept of human dignity seems to have initially 
been integrated into the legal instruments that currently form the basis of 
international human rights law, as a juridical concept dignity has a long lineage 
that can be traced to Roman law and is not exclusive to any particular religious 
tradition.140 In contemporary legal theory, dignity is generally associated with 
Immanuel Kant.141 In particular, as McCrudden points out, “the conception of 
dignity most closely associated with Kant is the idea of dignity as autonomy; 
that is, the idea that to treat people with dignity is to treat them as autonomous 
individuals able to choose their destiny.”142 In this sense, dignity could be said 
to cohere with the contractual autonomy model delineated earlier, for 
individuals choosing freely to exchange their own bodily goods and services 
(and the children thereby produced) for consideration might be seen as 
explicating a fundamental right to make decisions regarding themselves.143 But 
Kant also contrasts the status of a human being “in nature” with the status of 
human beings as “persons.”144 As a person, a human being “cannot give 
himself away for any price”; in other words, a human being is not subject to 
commodification.145 Moreover, a human being is bound not to disregard his or 
her own dignity; “[h]umanity in his person is the object of the respect which he 
can demand from every other human being, but which he also must not 
 
law); Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 848 (1983) (discussing 
inherent dignity). 
 140 On the history of dignity in contemporary international human rights law, see generally SAMUEL 
MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010). On the broader history of dignity as a juridical 
concept, see generally McCrudden, supra note 139. 
 141 For an account of Kant’s idea of dignity, see James Rachels, Kantian Theory: The Idea of Human 
Dignity, in THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 114–17, 122–23 (1986). 
 142 McCrudden, supra note 139, at 659–60. 
 143 Jeremy Waldron has defined dignity as, inter alia, entailing a person’s capacity and right to explain her 
own reasons, and has seen this principle as instantiated in legal institutions such as the right to trial. See 
Jeremy Waldron, Professor, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, The 2011 Sir David Williams Lecture: The Rule of Law 
and Human Dignity (May 6, 2011), available at http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/faculty-resources/summary/the-
2011-sir-david-williams-lecture-the-rule-of-law-and-human-dignity-video/8913. 
 144 Immanuel Kant, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 186–87 (Mary Gregor ed., 1996) (1797). 
 145 Id. at 255. As Martha Nussbaum explicates, the Kant (and Marx) notion of dignity entails recognizing 
“each person [as] a bearer of value.” MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE 
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 73 (2000). By contrast, “the core of what exploitation is, [is] to treat a person as a 
mere object for the use of others.” Id. 
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forfeit.”146 In this perspective, contractual autonomy is limited by respect for 
the non-commodification—the dignity—of the human being as a person.147 
A strong communitarian tradition sees the community as instrumental to 
the realization of the essential human value of the individual148 and endows the 
community with the right and obligation to intervene to safeguard the dignity 
of each member independently of the desire of any particular member.149 This 
obligation applies even if the impugned act causes no manifest harm to either 
the actor or another, and even if compliance with the rules of dignity imposes 
costs on the actor or the community or both. Conduct that violates a defined 
version of human dignity is taken as inherently damaging to the self as well as 
to the community. Once such conduct has occurred, no other consequences 
need flow to prove harm. Perhaps most significantly, the community is 
authorized to defend its conception of dignity even as against that of its own 
member whose conduct is at issue.150 
A noted Comment of the Human Rights Committee illustrates this 
perspective. Responding to a complaint against a French ban on dwarf-tossing 
in which the complainant alleged that the law deprived him of a job whereas 
 
 146 Id. at 186–87. Moreover, “Since he must regard himself not only as a person generally but also as a 
human being . . . his insignificance as a human animal may not infringe upon his consciousness of his dignity 
as a rational human being. . . . [H]e should pursue his end . . . not disavowing his dignity . . . .” Id. 
 147 See Michael Rosen, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 147 (2012) (noting, in reference to suicide, 
“Kant’s moral philosophy is not just directed to ‘what we owe each other’ but even more so to what we owe 
ourselves . . . .it would be better to understand Kant as asking first how we have to act in order to treat our 
dignity (our inner kernel of intrinsic value) with the proper respect”). 
 148 McCrudden contrasts the “more communitarian” approach of the German Constitutional Court to 
dignity to the more “individualistic” interpretations of the Hungarian Constitutional Court as well as of the 
U.S. and Canadian supreme courts. See McCrudden, supra note 139, at 699. Some commentators worry that 
the U.S. approach to rights could be undermined if the stronger European view of dignity were adopted. See, 
e.g., Guy E. Carmi, Dignity—The Enemy from Within: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis of Human 
Dignity as a Free Speech Justification, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 957, 999–1001 (2007); Neomi Rao, On the Use 
and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 201, 204 (2008). 
 149 Exemplifying the uneasy balance between individual liberty and community limit-setting embedded in 
communitarianism, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union specifies in the Preamble that 
“the Union . . . places the individual at the heart of its activities,” but then girds individual choice within 
precise parameters, including the following language under the rubric of the “Right to the Integrity of the 
Person” (Chapter I, Art. 3): “In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be respected in 
particular: . . . the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial gain.” 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 139, pmb., art. 1. On the risks to individual liberties associated with 
communitarian approaches to dignity, see Carmi, supra note 148; Rao, supra note 148. 
 150 McCrudden discusses communitarian approaches that do not permit dignity to be waived, and the 
difficulties courts encounter in determining whether—and to what extent—dignity should be evaluated from 
the subjective perspective of the person at issue or in relation to an “objective” standard. See McCrudden, 
supra note 139, at 705–07. 
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“dignity consists in having a job,”151 France argued that the ban on dwarf-
tossing contracts constituted: 
[A] classic instance in administrative police practice of reconciling 
the exercise of economic freedoms with the desire to uphold public 
order, one element of which is public morals . . . public order has 
long incorporated notions of public morals and . . . it would be 
shocking were the basic principle of due respect for the individual to 
be abandoned for the sake of material considerations specific to the 
[complainant] (and otherwise scarcely commonplace), to the 
detriment of the overall community to which the author belongs.152 
The Committee concluded that “the State party has demonstrated . . . that the 
ban on dwarf tossing . . . was necessary in order to protect public order, which 
brings into play considerations of human dignity. . . .”153 In a similar vein, the 
German Constitutional Court, in the Lifetime Imprisonment case, observed: 
The free person and his dignity are the highest values of the 
constitutional order. The state . . . is obliged to respect and defend it. 
This is based on the conception of man as a spiritual-moral being 
endowed with the freedom to determine and develop himself. This 
freedom within the meaning of the Basic Law is not that of an 
isolated self-regarding individual but rather of a person related to and 
bound by the community. In light of this community-boundedness, it 
[i.e., the freedom of the individual to determine and develop himself] 
cannot be “in principle unlimited.” The individual must allow those 
limits on his freedom of action that the legislature deems necessary in 
 
 151 Wackenheim v. France, No. 854/1999, para. 3, in HUM. RTS. COMM., SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL, No. 8, at 110, 111, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/8, 
U.N. Sales No. E.07.XIV.11 (2007) [hereinafter Wackenheim]. 
 152 Id. para. 4.5, at 112. The Committee’s decision follows a ruling by the Conseil d’Etat in the same 
dwarf tossing case: CE Ass., Oct. 27, 1995, Rec. Lebon 372. For a critical discussion of the concept of human 
dignity in relation to human rights, see generally Derek Beyleveld & Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity, 
Human Rights, and Human Genetics, 61 MOD. L. REV. 661 (1998). For a discussion of Wackenheim and other 
cases that connects dignity to the concept of rights as responsibilities, see Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, 
and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1130–34 (2011). The notion that certain goods and services are 
“res extra commercium,” i.e., per se not susceptible to the exercise of private rights and hence outside the 
reach of commercial transactions, is of Roman derivation and is today applied to such issues as cultural 
property and the ownership of space as well as to transactions in (some) bodily parts. For a discussion of 
“morally repugnant” contracts (and an economist’s accommodation to that notion), see Alvin E. Roth, 
Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 37 (2007). For a general discussion of the 
normative bases of objections to particular exchanges, see SANDEL, supra note 136; MICHAEL WALZER, 
SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983). 
 153 Wackenheim, supra note 151, para. 7.4, at 114. 
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the interest of the community’s social life; yet the autonomy of the 
individual has to be protected.154 
The Human Rights Committee’s view of human dignity—like that of the 
German Constitutional Court—ensconces the individual in the community, and 
as a function of the individual’s place in the community, the individual’s 
“material considerations” may be limited: Certain transactions are not 
allowable because they fail to comport with a normative vision of the social 
order (in Wackenheim’s terms, the “public order, one element of which is 
public morals”) within which freedom of individual choice is, of necessity, 
constrained.155 In this view, the community, rather than the individual, is the 
arbiter of an individual’s “human dignity;” that is, of the acceptable parameters 
of an individual’s ways of being. From the individual’s perspective, 
Wackenheim teaches, to be “human,” in the sense of acting in conformity with 
one’s “human dignity,” requires accepting particular behavioral rules (founded 
in a system of values identifiable as “public morals”) with which one may or 
may not agree but which the community articulates and applies.156 From the 
community’s perspective, Lifetime Imprisonment indicates, to construct a 
society of “humans” who realize their “human dignity” requires constraining 
individual action and ways of being so as to conform to the community’s 
definition of such dignity (thus safeguarding individual autonomy within this 
“community-boundedness”). In turn, however, this depends on the 
community’s definition of the “human.”157 
2. Human Dignity and the Status of the “Human” 
In the era of human rights, the “human” has attained a new centrality and 
value, constituting the primary subject of the social vision articulated in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed through successive 
 
 154 McCrudden, supra note 139, at 699–700 (citing D. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 32 (2d ed. 1997)) (emphasis removed). On the tension between 
“community-boundedness” and “individual autonomy” that has long engaged philosophers, see, for example, 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS 125–26 (Max Pensky ed., 
2001). 
 155 Wackenheim, supra note 151, para. 4.5. 
 156 See id. 
 157 See Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2092 (2001) (“Unlike autonomy, 
dignity depends upon intersubjective norms that define the forms of conduct that constitute respect between 
persons.”); Waldron, supra note 143. No summary of legal texts is sufficient to provide a substantive 
definition of dignity: what is needed, in Waldron’s terms, is a “jurisprudence of dignity, not a hornbook 
analysis.” Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Rank 3 (New York Univ. Sch. Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-50, 2009). 
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treaties.158 As has been repeatedly noted, this contrasts with the primary 
subjects of other orders in contemporary states: citizens and subjects.159 And 
like those of the citizen and the subject, the defining criteria of the “human” 
remain inherently contestable. International lawmaking bodies have addressed 
issues relating to the nature of humanity.160 Ongoing contests—for example, 
regarding fetuses or the identifying criteria of death—simultaneously 
denaturalize the vision of the human and highlight its political constitution and 
shifting juridical crystallizations.161 To be human is to occupy a particular 
position, albeit one whose substantive properties are not only historically 
mutable but also variable across legal orders. 
To be human, then, is at least theoretically to have particular status; that is, 
to have “legal rights, duties, liabilities, and other legal relations” that connect 
the individual to the rest of the community.162 Although there is a certain 
ineffability of status, it is nonetheless understandable as a “person’s legal 
condition insofar as it is imposed by the law without the person’s consent, as 
opposed to a condition that the person has acquired by agreement . . . .”163 
Being human is not merely “natural,”164 nor is it merely a matter of individual 
 
 158 Although this Article stresses the legal construction of the human as a status, the naturalization of that 
construction should also be noted. Joseph Slaughter acutely notes: 
[A] tautologized contemporary human rights law posits the primary existence of what it seeks to 
articulate, claiming as a priori what is simultaneously, impossibly, and necessarily a 
posteriori. . . . That is, the human rights personality preexists society and law and comes into 
being through social interaction and the collective declaration of human rights. Ultimately, of 
course, the personalities are one and the same; underwriting and underwritten by human rights, 
the human personality is both natural and positive, pre-social and social, premise and promise.  
JOSEPH R. SLAUGHTER, HUMAN RIGHTS, INC.: THE WORLD NOVEL, NARRATIVE FORM AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 79 (2007). 
 159 The ascription of rights to humanity as such rather than to other political statuses marks a discursive 
rupture even though its practical effects have often proven to be limited. 
 160 See, e.g., DOUWE KORFF, THE RIGHT TO LIFE: A GUIDE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 10 (2006) (citing X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8416/79, 19 
Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 244, 250 (1980)), available at http://echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/16D05FDF-
4831-47EC-AE6D-A2C760B0B630/0/DG2ENHRHAND082006.pdf. 
 161 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL 
RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH 13 (1981), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/past_ 
commissions/defining_death.pdf; The Uniform Determination of Death Act: An Effective Solution to the 
Problem of Defining Death, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1511, 1511–15 (1982). 
 162 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1542 (9th ed. 2009). 
 163 Id. 
 164 McCrudden notes that whereas in Roman law “dignitas” was associated with particular statuses, 
Cicero and others deployed a broader conception of dignity, associating it with “human beings as human 
beings, not dependent on any particular additional status.” McCrudden, supra note 139, at 657. McCrudden 
then observes that “where human beings are regarded as having a certain worth by virtue of being human, the 
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will or of private agreement: One cannot declare oneself or another to be 
human or suddenly transmogrify into another type of animal or an inert entity 
for state-defined pathways and their attendant certifications to come into play. 
Just as entry into the status of human requires conformity with legally 
prescribed criteria (conception/live birth, brain and cardiac function) and state-
approved attestation (birth certificate, identity documents), exit is also 
dependent on legally prescribed criteria and the attendant certifications (lack of 
discernible brain and/or cardiac function; death certificates). Even suicide 
marks the legally cognizable end of a life only when it is appropriately 
documented and takes a particular physiological form, being denoted by the 
kinds of events (such as the absence of brain or cardiac function or both) that, 
in a given legal order, signify death.165 
Moreover, if to be human, as Hannah Arendt famously noted, is to have the 
“right to have rights,” historicity requires that this description be taken out of 
its generic form: At any given time and place, to be human is to have the right 
to these rights, as specified in these rights-endowing charters and other law-
making documents, valid in this context.166 Take as a template the texts often 
referred to as the International Bill of Rights—the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,167 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights,168 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.169 A 
human is a being who can claim all the rights enumerated in the covenants and 
is subject to the prohibitions also encoded therein, precisely because it is the 
ensemble of these rights with their penumbras and emanations170 including 
their (largely implicit) obligations and restrictions, that is essential to the 
realization of “human-ness.” In sum, the status of human is both complex and 
sticky. Once attained, it engenders an ontological transformation that mere 
 
concept of human dignity raises important questions such as ‘What kinds of beings are we? How do we 
appropriately express the kinds of beings we are?’” Id. Waldron also relates dignity to the status of human 
beings, although he relates it more closely to rank. See Waldron, supra note 152, at 1119–20. 
 165 On the social and legal processes entailed in the certification of a death as being the result of suicide, 
see Susanne Langer, et al., Documenting the Quick and the Dead: A Study of Suicide Case Files in a 
Coroner’s Office, 56 SOC. REV. 293 (2008). 
 166 HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 296 (2nd ed. 1976). 
 167 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 139. 
 168 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights]. 
 169 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. 95-20, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 170 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“The foregoing cases suggest that specific 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give 
them life and substance.”). 
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contract does not affect; it extends beyond any one transaction to color 
multiple facets of an individual’s position in the community. Nor is that status 
easily lost, for its loss does not depend simply on one’s inclinations or on any 
private bargain one may strike. In turn, this implies that normative limits 
associated with the status of being human cannot be freely dis-attended. One 
cannot stop being human, and to be human means there are certain things one 
cannot do, for such actions would violate the dignity associated with one’s 
status. The safeguarding of human dignity is not, therefore, merely up to the 
individual but constitutes a community obligation and prerogative, authorizing 
the imposition of limits on how the individual treats herself as well as 
others.171 
The prohibition against commodification can be viewed as one such 
limit.172 Indeed, international agreements and the jurisprudence of numerous 
courts reflect the notion that dignity prohibits the commodification of the 
human body independently of the will of the individual whose 
commodification is at issue.173 In the words of the European Convention on 
 
 171 This is not to suggest that in a communitarian perspective there are no limits to the community’s right 
to regulate individual behavior. 
 172 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to 
Biology and Medicine art. 21, Apr. 4, 1997, E.T.S. no. 164 [hereinafter Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to Biology and Medicine]. The complexities of 
the relationship between dignity, the understanding of the “human,” and gender are beyond the scope of this 
Article. It is important to note, however, that if, as per Moyn’s account, dignity has made its way into 
contemporary international human rights law in part under the impetus of Catholic understandings of 
humanity, the gender-differentiated view of human identity encapsulated within the over-arching figure of 
humanity that is central to Catholic theology may continue to have a significant influence on the interpretation 
of dignity, and hence may be seen as justifying limits on women’s conduct that are intrinsic to womanhood 
rather than pertaining more generally to human beings. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. In this 
perspective, surrogacy may be seen to offend women’s dignity per se and not solely because it entails the 
commodification of the human body. “The ‘fullness of time’ manifests the extraordinary dignity of the 
‘woman.’ . . . From this point of view, the ‘woman’ is the representative and the archetype of the whole human 
race . . . [from another] the event at Nazareth highlights a form of union with the living God which can only 
belong to the ‘woman,’ Mary: the union between mother and son.” Apostolic Letter from Pope John Paul II, 
Muilieris Dignitatem (Aug. 15, 1988), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_ 
letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_15081988_mulieris-dignitatem_en.html. While scholarship on dignity and 
rights has largely focused on the human generally, insufficient attention has been paid to human dignity as a 
potentially gendered concept, a notable exception being Reva Siegel’s work. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and 
the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008). For a 
critical discussion of current Catholic doctrine with respect to gender, see Mary Anne Case, After Gender the 
Destruction of Man? The Vatican’s Nightmare Vision of the “Gender Agenda” for Law, 31 PACE L. REV. 802 
(2011). 
 173 H. Tristram Engelhart, Jr., Giving, Selling, and Having Taken: Conflicting Views of Organ Transfer, 1 
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 31, 42–44 (2004); Irma S. Russell, Within the Best Interests of the Child: The Factor of 
Parental Status in Custody Disputes Arising from Surrogacy Contracts, 27 J. FAM. L. 585, 588–91 (1988–89); 
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Human Rights and Biomedicine (echoing the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights), “the human body and its parts shall not, as such, give 
rise to financial gain.”174 And the South African Constitutional Court noted: 
Our Constitution values human dignity which inheres in various 
aspects of what it means to be a human being. One of these aspects is 
the fundamental dignity of the human body which is not simply 
organic. Neither is it something to be commodified. Our Constitution 
requires that it be respected.175 
Such stances are echoed in positions regarding surrogacy. Asked to counsel the 
Senate on the advisability of revising France’s prohibitionist legislation on 
surrogacy, the French national committee on ethics and biomedicine 
acknowledged that the meaning of dignity is contested. It contrasted the notion 
that “reproductive surrogacy represents an instrumentalization of women’s 
bodies and leads to considering the child as a commodity, such that this 
practice is irreducibly contrary to the respect of the dignity of the human 
person,”176 with a more “individualistic” view that conditions the acceptability 
of surrogacy on the free consent of all the parties and the gestational carrier’s 
opinion that it does not violate her dignity. “The respect of dignity is therefore 
opposed by the freedom to dispose of oneself,” the Committee observed, thus 
dissociating the position the Committee termed individualistic from the 
position concerning a woman’s dignity before ultimately concluding that the 
prohibition on surrogacy should stay in place.177 Germany and Switzerland 
explain their opposition to commercial surrogacy by referencing its reduction 
of the gestational carrier and the child she bears to objects of contract.178 Such 
 
Constance Johnson, Council of Europe/United Nations: Organ Trafficking Treaty Proposed, GLOBAL LEGAL 
MONITOR (Oct. 15. 2009), http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205401623_text. 
 174 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to 
Biology and Medicine, supra note 172, art. 21; see also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
supra note 139, at 1. 
 175 The court went on to explain the limitation of the freedom to contract prostitution services: “We do not 
believe that [the provision prohibiting prostitution] can be said to be the cause of any limitation on the dignity 
of the prostitute. To the extent that the dignity of prostitutes is diminished, the diminution arises from the 
character of prostitution itself.” Waldron, supra note 152, at 1131–32 (citing Jordan v. State 2002 (1) SA 1 
(CC) at 31 (S. Afr.) (O’Regan and Sachs, JJ., concurring)). 
 176 COMITÉ CONSULTATIF NATIONAL D’ÉTHIQUE POUR LES SCIENCES DE LA VIE ET DE LA SANTÉ 
[NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE ETHICS COMMITTEE FOR HEALTH AND LIFE SCIENCES], AVIS NO. 110: PROBLÈMES 
ÉTHIQUES SOULÈVES PAR LA GESTATION POUR AUTRUI 14, available at http://www.ccne-ethique.fr/docs/Avis_ 
110.pdf. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Hague Conference Report 2012, supra note 4, at 8 (citing studies regarding Germany and 
Switzerland). 
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a perspective juxtaposes limitations derived from the status and dignity of 
human beings to the maximum contractual autonomy described above. 
3. Filiation as Status-Attribution 
However, it is not only the generic status of human beings that imposes 
limits on contractual autonomy. As a matter of fact and not only of theory, the 
legal attribution of parental status—for example, via inscription on a birth 
certificate—declares and constitutes the individual as a parent, whose entry 
into, exit from, and specific obligations with respect to this status extend 
beyond the exclusive reach of individual negotiation.179 Of all statuses, 
maternity may be among the “stickiest,” as evidenced by the rules regarding its 
voluntary rejection or termination and as further manifested in the breadth of 
policy areas within which it carries significance.180 Being (or being in the 
process of becoming) a “mother” in the legal sense entails rights and 
obligations from nurturance and child care to pre- and post-partum leave, child 
custody, and pension rights. In numerous jurisdictions, motherhood is 
constitutionalized, and, in some, women’s social citizenship is directly linked 
to maternity: In the words of the Italian Constitution, “working women are 
entitled to equal rights . . . as men. Working conditions must allow women to 
fulfill their essential role in the family and ensure appropriate protection for the 
mother and child.”181 In a similar vein, the Constitution of Ireland recites: 
[T]he State recognizes that by her life within the home, woman gives 
to the State a support without which the common good cannot be 
achieved. The State shall, therefore, endeavor to ensure that mothers 
shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labor to the 
neglect of their duties in the home.182 
More generally, the Grundgesetz of Germany provides as a basic right that 
“[e]very mother is entitled to protection by and care of the community.”183 The 
definition of “mother,” at least in these jurisdictions, is a constitutional matter. 
 
 179 The French Civil Code, for example, specifies that maternity is established by mentioning the name of 
the mother in the birth certificate. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 311–25 (Fr.). 
 180 It is worth noting the pathways for entry into and exit from maternity as a legal status generally differ 
in significant respects from those entailed by paternity. 
 181 Art. 37 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.), translated in Constitution of the Italian Republic (Parliamentary 
Information, Archives and Publications Office of the Senate Service for Official Reports and Communication, 
http://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf (last visited May 5, 2013) . 
 182 IR. CONST., 1937, art. 41. 
 183 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 
23, 1949, BGBL. I, art. 6(4) (Ger.). 
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This does not suggest that motherhood cannot be pluralized.184 Rather, it 
highlights the state interest in the forms that such pluralization may take. 
Trends favoring contractual choice with respect to parental status have 
gained salience as a result of advances in technology and the multiplication of 
legally recognized family forms.185 Some courts and legislatures have looked 
to the consent of non-biological, non-marital partners to determine parental 
status.186 Thus, for example, men or women who had consented to their 
partner’s use of third-party sperm or ova in order to bear a child have been 
found to have consented to assuming the rights and obligations of parenthood 
for the children thus conceived.187 Courts have also upheld the recognition of 
“functional” parents: those who have assumed parental responsibilities for 
children and performed the attendant roles, generally on a basis of consent with 
the already recognized legal parents.188 The legalization of surrogacy in some 
states is a prominent indicator of possible movement in the direction of greater 
choice with respect to maternity. But these trends point to an expansion of the 
regulated forms of parenthood—including maternity—rather than to a retreat 
of regulation in favor of contractual autonomy. There may be more options to 
choose from, but paternity or maternity is still a status dependent on state 
sanction. 
4. “Mother” as Status 
Legal recognition as a “mother” generally appears to be incident to 
childbirth, but other pathways to maternal status come into play in a variety of 
contexts besides childbirth, such as adoption, assisted reproductive technology, 
 
 184 Greece, for example, recognizes and strictly regulates surrogacy arrangements, criminalizing any 
arrangement that does not conform to its legislation. See Hague Conference Report 2012, supra note 4, at 11. 
 185 Russell, supra note 173, at 592. 
 186 Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L. 683, 720–27 
(2000). 
 187 Trends toward greater private party autonomy and the recognition of individual contractual ability 
have also been documented with respect marriage, at least in the United States. See Elizabeth S. Scott & 
Robert E. Scott, Marriage as a Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998). Note that here—as with 
parental status—although there may now be greater scope for individual choice, as the recent mobilizations in 
regard to same-sex unions have highlighted, ultimately the recognition of a person as married or not, and the 
rights and obligations flowing therefrom, are directly dependent on state sanction and engender a 
transformation of the status of the persons involved into “spouses” (or, depending on the legal order, 
“husbands” and “wives”). 
 188 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
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and immigration.189 Pathways to maternal status include judicial disposition, 
administrative procedures, genetic linkage, and recognition of the de facto 
assumption of maternal responsibilities.190 But no matter how it has been 
attained, once formalized, maternity is not a condition one can terminate “at 
will.”191 Dereliction of responsibilities can expose the woman who gives birth 
to charges of abandonment unless the abandonment itself takes place within 
legally recognized “safe havens” where mothers can leave their children 
without fear of prosecution or in accordance with other specified procedures.192 
Moreover, some states distinguish motherhood and maternity so that legal 
maternity is conferred only through a positive act of registration rather than by 
virtue of delivery itself.193 Some states, such as France, permit “anonymous 
maternity,” which allows women not to identify themselves as the mothers of 
the children to whom they have just given birth, but there does not seem to be a 
trend toward the establishment of this institution.194 Adoption, which is legal in 
more than eighty states (as indicated by the ratifications of the Adoption 
Convention)195 and barred in others (including states following Shari’a law),196 
 
 189 For example, U.S. regulatory practice identifies the “mother” as the provider of ova for purposes of 
determining nationality, with consequences that may be unforeseen by the ova provider herself and the 
gestator as well as the commissioning parent. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 190 Appell, supra note 186, at 694. 
 191 On maternal separation, see Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375 (1996). 
 192 The creation of “safe havens” has a long tradition in Europe, and has recently been resumed in the 
United States and elsewhere as an attempt to reduce risks of infanticide. For a discussion of maternal 
abandonment, its historical treatment and the establishment of safe havens, see Sanger, supra note 128. For a 
comparative analysis of the law in England, France and Germany, see Katherine O’Donovan, “Real” Mothers 
for Abandoned Children, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 347, 347–78 (2002). 
 193 See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. definition of “mother” for the purposes 
of immigration). France attributes legal status to a mother only upon inscription of her name in the child’s birth 
certificate. However, the duty of inscription falls to the officier d’etat civil (the state officer for civil status), 
who must compile the birth certificate (on the basis of the declaration of anyone who was present at the birth) 
within three days of the birth itself. A declaration that provides a different name than that of the woman who 
actually gave birth is a criminal offense. A woman who delivers may choose not to be identified as the mother, 
but this does not enable the substitution of the name of the woman who gave birth with that of another. 
 194 Jean Ayissi, Legère Augmentation des Accouchements Sous X en France, LE MONDE (Sept. 22, 2011), 
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2011/09/22/legere-augmentation-des-accouchements-sous-x-en-france_ 
1575729_3224.html. 
 195 See Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption: 
Status Table, HCCH, available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69 (last 
updated Mar. 21, 2013). 
 196 Although Shari’a law generally does not allow for adoption as institutionalized in the Adoption 
Convention, in some states similar transfers of parental status may be effected through guardianship. Adoption 
of Children from Countries in which Islamic Shari’a law is observed. FAQ: Adoption of Children from 
Countries in Which Islamic Shari’a Law is Observed, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://adoption.state.gov/adoption_ 
process/faqs/adoption_of_children_countries_islamic_sharia_observed.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
ERGAS GALLEYSPROOFS3 7/22/2013 9:33 AM 
2013] BABIES WITHOUT BORDERS 159 
generally conditions the transfer of parental rights on the formal renunciation 
of such rights by the birth parents.197 
Neither the institution of anonymous birth, nor adoption (in its 
internationally sanctioned form), nor surrogacy imports a private contract 
model into filiation: The state remains a crucial player. Although “private” 
adoption is possible in some jurisdictions,198 the relinquishment of maternal 
rights and their transfer are subject to legal norms and, generally, state 
supervision. Surrogacy, although it often does contain contractual elements, 
cannot function without state sanction precisely because, as with both 
anonymous birth and adoption, ultimately the recognition of filiation is 
determined by the state and not solely by the agreement of the parties. In the 
United States, for example, states that allow surrogacy arrangements 
nonetheless regulate the attribution of parental status.199 In France, the Cour de 
Cassation recently remarked in reference to that country’s refusal to legitimate 
filiation based on surrogacy arrangements that such arrangements are 
incompatible with the fundamental principle of the “indisponibilité”—or 
unavailability—of status.200 By virtue of the “indisponibilité de l’état des 
personnes,” individuals may not freely modify their status.201 In a communique 
explicating the relevant decision, the court noted: “In effect, it is a matter of 
principle in French law, that the mother of the child is she who gives birth.”202 
Parentage and filiation, in other words, are firmly anchored in law and not 
subject to private agreement. 
 
 197 See Adoption Convention, supra note 61, art. 4(c)(4). 
 198 Adoption: An Overview, LEGAL INFO. INST. (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ 
adoption. 
 199 For instance, under section 160.753 of the Texas Family Code, which establishes the legality of 
surrogacy arrangements, the commissioning parties acquire their relative parental statuses through a process of 
adjudication. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.753 (West 2012). 
 200 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], 1e civ., Apr. 6, 2011, Bull. civ. IV, No. 
72 (Fr.). 
 201 Press Release, Cour de cassation, Communiqué de la Première Présidence (Apr. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/File/communiquePP_avril_2011.pdf [hereinafter Communiqué de la 
Première Présidence]. 
 202 Id. The court’s emphasis on this point strongly implies that the institution of “anonymous birth” 
discussed above should be regarded as an exceptional choice but not the default position of French law. 
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5. The Implication of States and the International Community in the 
Production of Family Status 
The implication of states in the definition of individual status, particularly 
in relation to family arrangements, has deep historical roots.203 In the modern 
era, from Greece to India, Italy to the United States, family policies have been 
intrinsically tied to strategies of nation building (albeit often in the context of 
intense and ongoing jurisdictional contests with religious and customary 
communities).204 State policies define the boundaries of family ties, 
establishing, for example, the degrees of consanguinity within which incest 
prohibitions will apply and inheritance will be ensured.205 Analogously, states 
routinely prescribe rules regarding child and spousal maintenance and 
generally establish the scope of matrimonial, parental, and filial obligations.206 
European feminists have long argued that laws and policies that explicitly 
 
 203 The French Revolution “Statalized” individual identity by instituting the “état civil,” thereby shifting 
responsibility for its documentation from parish registries to the state. In effect, the law of Germinal sought to 
“nationalize” identity, and as Jane Caplan points out, the current variety of state rules pertaining to naming has 
continued to reinforce the linkage between individual identity, status, and nationality. See Jane Caplan, “This 
or That Particular Person”: Protocols of Identification in Nineteenth-Century Europe, in DOCUMENTING 
INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE PRACTICES IN THE MODERN WORLDS 49–66 (Jane Caplan 
& John Torpey eds., 2001). The ability of the state to fully “capture” individual identity was subject to 
resistance, and practices that distinguish between legal names and names used in familial or other contexts 
survived the revolutionary legislation and survive in many communities today. Id. Note that international 
human rights law protects every child’s right to a name, a requirement that could be seen as entailing a 
correlative obligation of states to ensure that each child has a legally cognizable name (and therefore a 
personal identity). Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 7, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]. The history of status documentation, and its correlative rights and obligations, is 
the focus of a growing area of historical research. See generally DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF STATE PRACTICES IN THE MODERN WORLDS, supra. 
 204 On family law, colonial policies, and anti-colonial nation-building policies, see generally LILA ABU-
LUGHOD ET AL., REMAKING WOMEN: FEMINISM, MODERNITY AND THE MIDDLE EAST (Lila Abu-Lughod ed., 
1998); Narendra Subramanian, Making Family and Nation: Hindu Marriage Law in Early Postcolonial India, 
J. ASIAN STUD. 771 (2010). On the evolution of family law in the United States, see generally MARY ANN 
GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
EUROPE (1989). On Greece, see generally Philomila Tsoukala, Marrying Family Law to the Nation, 58 AM. J. 
COMP L. 873 (2010). On Italy, see generally LA FAMIGLIA ITALIANA DALL’OTTOCENTO A OGGI (Piero 
Melograni ed., 1988); Anna Bravo, La Nuova Italia: madri fra oppressione ed emancipazione, in STORIA 
DELLA MATERNITÀ (Marina D’Amelia ed., 1997). On the nexus between visions of the nation, gender and the 
family in the Italian constitutional debate, see Yasmine Ergas, The Politics of Moral Reconstruction (1988) (on 
file with the Institute for Advanced Study and the author). For a discussion of the role of the state in relation to 
the co-construction of the family and the market, see Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in 
Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 753 (2010). 
 205 GLENDON, supra note 209, at 55–58, 238–51. 
 206 Id. at 197–238. 
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mold family relations and that presume the existence of certain forms of family 
organization are central to the governance of welfare states.207 
This connection between states and familial status has been recognized in 
international law. In particular, international private law is replete with 
examples of conflicts that revolve around marriage, filiation, and kinship,208 
and conflicts rules have frequently looked to nationality over domicile as a 
“connecting factor” in relation to personal status.209 But today, international 
institutions are also seen as producing status. An authoritative commentator on 
the Convention of the Rights of the Child noted: “The CRC creates a new 
status of the child based on the recognition that s/he is a person and has the 
right to live a life of dignity and since the promulgation 1989 [sic] the child has 
been understood to be a subject of rights.”210 The “child” is not the only 
subject of internationally defined status. The Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women similarly operates to provide 
women a “new status,” one in which maternity plays a central role.211 The 
Convention promotes the recognition of “maternity as a social function” and 
establishes its protection as a prohibited basis for discrimination: “special 
measures aimed at protecting maternity . . . shall not be considered 
discriminatory.”212 Maternity protection is “proclaimed as [an] essential 
 
 207 See, e.g., LAURA BALBO, STATO DI FAMIGLIA: BISOGNI, PRIVATO, COLLETTIVO (1976); LAURA BALBO 
& RENATE SIEBERT, INTERFERENZE: LO STATO, LA VITA FAMILIARE, LA VITA PRIVATA (1979); GOSTA ESPING-
ANDERSON, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM (1990); HELGA MARIA HERNES, WELFARE STATE 
AND WOMAN POWER: ESSAYS IN STATE FEMINISM (1987); JANE JENSON & MARIETTE SINEAU, WHO CARES? 
WOMEN’S WORK, CHILD CARE AND WELFARE STATE REDESIGN (2001); Symposium, Gender and Public 
Policies, 58 Soc. Res. 623 (1991); Jane Lewis, Gender and the Development of Welfare Regimes, 2 J. EURO. 
SOC. POL’Y 159 (1992). 
 208 See generally Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010) (discussing whether a father had a right of 
custody of a child by reason of the father’s ne exeat right, which requires that the father give his permission 
before the child can leave the country). For a discussion of the conflicts issues raised by the case, see Linda J. 
Silberman, Abbott v. Abbott, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 108 (2011). 
 209 As a result of the preference for nationality, forum courts find themselves applying foreign law. 
Although states’ (and courts’) preferences for domicile or citizenship as a determining element in private 
international law relating to personal status now appears to be in flux, throughout the 19th century and until 
World War II, in Europe, “citizenship has traditionally played an important role as a connecting factor in the 
private international law relating to personal status.” Jürgen Basedow, Das Staatsangehörigkeitsprinzip in der 
Europäischen Union, 2011 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALENPRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS [IPRAX]109 
(2011). 
 210 Jean Zermatten, The Best Interests of the Child Principle: Literal Analysis and Function, 18 INT’L J. 
CHILD. RTS. 483, 483 (2010). Zermatten is the Director of the International Institute for the Rights of the Child 
and Vice-Chairperson of the United Nations Committee for the Rights of the Child. 
 211 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women pmbl., opened for 
signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
 212 Id. arts. 4(2), 5(1)(b). 
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right[] . . . incorporated into all areas of the Convention, whether dealing with 
employment, family law, health care or education.”213 Woman-as-mother (or 
mother tout court, for the Convention does not contemplate the possibility that 
“maternity” could be an attribute of anyone other than a woman) is the bearer 
of a specific array of rights. Other instruments of human rights law also require 
the recognition of maternity, such as the conventions established under the 
aegis of the International Labor Organization in regard to the protection of 
maternity.214 International status-formation does not imply a retreat from 
national regulation; to the contrary, it entails additional regulation. 
In summary, a “communitarian” model implies that filiation, maternity, and 
paternity constitute legitimate objects of state regulation and that such 
regulation may take place at both the international and national levels. The 
postulation of “mother” (and “father” and/or “parent”) as denoting status rather 
than as the result of private contract, and thus of filiation as a matter of law 
rather than individual preference, carries with it the idea that certain 
behaviors—including the performance of particular paid-for services (like 
gestation) and the sale of particular goods (such as ova and sperm)—may 
inherently violate the “dignity” that accompanies such statuses as well as the 
more general status of human beings. This militates against contractual 
autonomy as a paradigm for the solution to the current dilemmas raised by the 
international market in reproductive surrogacy. In even the loosest 
communitarian framework, neither national nor international law is held to the 
standard of substantive silence when it comes to parental statuses and their 
correlative behaviors as required by the contractual autonomy model described 
above, nor are private agreements regarded as ipso facto preempting the power 
of regulation. Insofar as communitarianism either explicitly or implicitly 
informs the policies of contemporary states, solutions to the quandaries in 
which Jan Balaz, Susan Lohle, and their children found themselves will require 
state action. 
 
 213 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) (introducing the 
Convention and explaining its provisions). 
 214 See generally Convention Concerning the Revision of the Maternity Protection Convention, June 15, 
2000, 2181 U.N.T.S. 253. 
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III.  TREATY ZONES AND THE LIMITING POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
A. The Necessity of International Regulation 
A different approach to the problem is through international coordination 
and multilateral agreement. Indeed, given the obstacles to contractual 
autonomy flowing from the states’ role in determining filiation and citizenship, 
a multilateral agreement represents the only possible solution, for it would 
assign the responsibility for crisis prevention to the very subjects with the 
power to address it: the states.215 Grounds for cautious optimism on this score 
may be warranted: The Hague Conference on Private International Law, under 
whose aegis conventions on cognate themes—inter-country adoption, child 
abduction, parental responsibility, and child support—have already been 
agreed, has begun exploratory work on cross-frontier surrogacy and has 
developed some preliminary recommendations,216 and research and discussions 
intended to help inform such work have already been undertaken by networks 
of experts and government officials.217 But a rapid survey of current regulatory 
scenarios reveals a wide array of positions, from states that adopt explicit 
prohibitionist stances to states that have no regulations in place but have 
implemented ad hoc administrative and/or judicial decisions to states that have 
legalized surrogacy when it is based on non-commercial (i.e. “altruistic”) 
arrangements or exclusively within their own domestic markets to states that 
are broadly permissive.218 States’ apparent propensity to erect barriers to cross-
border trade in this sector—both by legalizing only domestic arrangements and 
by requiring that these be non-commercial—limits the scope of legal 
international commercial surrogacy. But is agreement—whether explicit or 
implicit—nonetheless possible? And if so, on what basis? 
 
 215 Robert Keohane and David Victor have suggested that in particular situations a “complex” of “loosely 
coupled” regimes without a clear hierarchical structure may be more effective than one regime built around a 
comprehensive treaty framework. See Robert O. Keohane & David G.Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate 
Change, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 7, 7 (2011). However, the crises represented by the Balaz twins derives from the 
coexistence of incompatible filiation norms; any effective solution therefore requires specific state-based 
agreement on at least that issue. Id. 
 216 For a full list of treaties agreed under the aegis of the Hague Conference, see Conventions, HAGUE 
CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.listing (last visited Mar. 22, 
2013). With respect to the Hague Conference’s work on reproductive surrogacy, see generally Hague 
Conference Report 2011, supra note 21. 
 217 For example, Katarina Trimmings and Paul Beaumont organized a workshop on surrogacy in late 
2011. See International Workshop on National Approaches to Surrogacy, U. ABERDEEN SCH. L., http://www. 
abdn.ac.uk/law/surrogacy/events.shtml (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
 218 Hague Conference Report 2012, supra note 4, at 9–17. 
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Pre-negotiation agreement is not necessary to ensure the successful 
establishment of an international regime. To the contrary, as Robert Keohane 
pointed out in his classic study After Hegemony, cooperation is necessary 
where harmony does not exist; cooperation presumes discord—but then sets in 
motion a process of mutual adjustments that issues in a framework that each 
party perceives as facilitating the realization of its own ends.219 Thus, even 
within an effective regime, all participants need not agree on all issues. Both 
traditions of international negotiation and current legal doctrines allow for 
areas of disagreement: The negotiation of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child exemplifies the strategic use of indeterminacy. Faced with 
insurmountable differences, the drafters defined only an end-point of 
childhood (eighteen years), leaving the question of its beginning—whether at 
conception, birth, or some other stage—to each signatory’s discretion.220 
Nonetheless, for an agreement that is to be effective in dealing with the crises 
associated with cross-border surrogacy, some consensus must be reached on 
key terms. Since disagreements are based in norms regarding filiation—
specifically, the willingness of “importing” countries to recognize births 
occurring in “exporting” jurisdictions—these norms will have to be addressed. 
B. Unsettling Filiation—and Citizenship 
1. Surrogacy and the Inadequacy of the Adoption Analogy 
Who, then, for purposes of filiation, is a “mother,” a “father,” a “child”? 
What bonds tie one to the other, and how can such statuses be acquired, lost, or 
modified?221 In reproductive surrogacy, these questions raise issues that are 
more complex than those faced by the drafters of its closest cognate, the 
Adoption Convention. Drafters of that convention could proceed from several 
basic assumptions. First, the child had a cognizable identity that preceded the 
adoption process and that supported the “state of origin’s” exercise of 
jurisdiction over the child, enabling that State to issue appropriate identity 
 
 219 ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY 49–54 (1984). 
 220 See UNICEF, IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK FOR THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 1–3 
(2007). 
 221 The Adoption Convention refers to “the child” and “the mother” without providing a definition of 
either. Adoption Convention, supra note 61, art. 16. The current uncertainties regarding the status of the child 
have been broached in a document presented by the Permanent Secretariat of the Hague Conference. See 
Hague Conference Report 2011, supra note 21. For a summary of recent discussions, see generally Council of 
Eur., Comm. of Experts on Family Law, Rep. of the Third Meeting of the CJ-FA-GT3, Oct. 6–8, 2010 (Dec. 
14, 2010). 
ERGAS GALLEYSPROOFS3 7/22/2013 9:33 AM 
2013] BABIES WITHOUT BORDERS 165 
documents.222 Second, the woman who gave birth was the mother.223 Through 
a process subject to certification both in the child’s state of origin and in the 
receiving state, the status of mother could be transferred, but in the first 
instance, the rights of motherhood vested in she who bore the child.224 Finally, 
 
 222 Issuance of identity papers may be based on citizenship but presumably need not be, so long as the 
child’s state of origin can, in accordance with its internal laws, provide the certifications of adoptability 
(including with respect to identity) that the Adoption Convention requires and issue appropriate exit 
documents. See Adoption Convention, supra note 61, art. 4. An adoption under the Convention does not per se 
confer citizenship; rather it creates a legally cognizable familial status that can form the basis for a petition for 
citizenship. In the United States, for example, children adopted from abroad must go through an immigration 
process that is predicated on the adoptive parents having successfully filed a Petition to Classify Convention 
Adoptee as an Immediate Relative. See Immigrant Visa Process, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://adoption.state.gov/ 
us_visa_for_your_child/visas.php (last visited Jan. 26, 2013); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Fact 
Sheet: Hague Adoption Convention, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614 
176543f6d1a/?vgnextchannel=68439c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextoid=7b500c5a5d0
68110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD (last updated Feb. 29, 2008). With respect to Australia, which also 
does not confer citizenship ipso facto on adoption, see DEP’T OF IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP, FORM 1272, 
APPLICATION FOR AUSTRALIAN CITIZENSHIP FOR CHILDREN ADOPTED UNDER FULL HAGUE CONVENTION 
ARRANGEMENTS (2013) (Austl.). 
 223 See Adoption Convention, supra note 61, art. 4(c)(4) (“[T]he consent of the mother, where required, 
has been given only after the birth of the child.”). The definite article before “mother” denotes her singularity; 
the lack of definition of the term “mother,” a term followed immediately by reference to the birth, indicates 
that, without further specification, the mother is the woman to whom the child is connected by birth. 
Moreover, throughout the convention, the text counter-poses the child’s “prospective adoptive parents” to the 
child’s “mother” or “father,” thereby signifying that the latter have the identity of parents until they renounce it 
or it is otherwise severed by operation of law and the correlative rights and obligations are transferred to the 
adoptive parents. See id. arts. 4, 26, 27. A notable exception to the rule that the mother is she who gives birth is 
that adopted by the U.S. State Department in interpreting section 301 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”), which defines “nationals and citizens of the United States at birth.” 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006). 
Referring to children born outside of the United States, at subsections (c), (d), and (g) the Act indicates the 
conditions under which citizenship and nationality may be recognized to those “born . . . of parents” where the 
parents themselves satisfy particular residency and citizenship requirements. Id. § 1401(c), (d), (g). The State 
Department interprets the phrase “born . . . of” to mean that, in assisted reproduction cases, where the parent 
providing the required nexus to the United States is the mother, the provider of genetic material rather than the 
gestational carrier will be understood to be the mother. See Important Information for U.S. Citizens 
Considering the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) Abroad, U.S. DEP’T STATE, 
http://travel.state.gov/law/citizenship/citizenship_5177.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). The State Department 
interprets the INA to require a U.S. citizen parent to have a biological connection to a child in order to transmit 
U.S. citizenship to the child at birth. See id.  
 224 “There shall be no contact between the prospective adoptive parents and the child’s parents or any 
other person who has care of the child until the requirements of Article 4, sub-paragraphs a) to c), and Article 
5, sub-paragraph a), have been met, unless the adoption takes place within a family or unless the contact is in 
compliance with the conditions established by the competent authority of the State of origin.” Adoption 
Convention, supra note 61, art. 29; see also id. arts. 17, 26, 27. That these legal aspects could be addressed 
directly by the Adoption Convention does not, of course, imply that the social and emotional ramifications of 
the transfer of parental status, and the multiplication of parental figures in adoption, is not fraught with 
complications. See generally CONCEIVING THE NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 6; CULTURES OF 
TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION, supra note 6. 
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adoption could be viewed as a humanitarian transaction that matched needy 
children with desiring parents, while the commercial transactions involved 
could be considered extraneous to the substance of the agreement. This 
cohered with prescriptions already encoded in human rights law through the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which recognizes adoption as a 
potential solution for children living in exceptionally difficult circumstances 
and calls for its regulation so as to ensure, among other objectives, “that, in 
inter-country adoption, the placement does not result in improper financial gain 
for those involved in it.”225 
2. Jus Sanguinis: Law, Blood, and the Corporeal Nexus 
Surrogacy unsettles these assumptions, and the ensuing uncertainty directly 
affects the child’s rights to nationality, citizenship, and, consequently, 
migration. In surrogacy, three potential “mothers” are in play: the egg 
provider, the gestator, and a commissioning party.226 Analogously, two 
potential fathers are involved: the sperm donor and a commissioning party. 
How each of these roles is assigned has profound societal implications. In 
matrilinear societies, for example, maternal descent determines the assignment 
of group identity; it is the sine qua non of belonging.227 Perhaps in response to 
the development of reproductive surrogacy, a significant number of Orthodox 
Jewish rabbis (who often espouse divergent perspectives but largely seem to 
accept the legitimacy of assisted reproductive treatments) have shifted their 
general view of the defining characteristic of maternity.228 Whereas Jewish law 
(like the French law cited earlier) once adhered to the principle that the mother 
is she who gives birth, the view that the mother is the ova-provider now 
 
 225 CRC, supra note 203, pmbl., art. 21(d). But see Sara Dillon, Making Legal Regimes for Intercountry 
Adoption Reflect Human Rights Principles: Transforming the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child with the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 179, 185 (2003) (“[S]ome 
would say there is no way to safeguard intercountry adoption against corruption and profiteering.”). 
 226 Assisted reproductive technologies have pluralized the subjects involved in reproduction, but only 
surrogacy involves a gestator who is by definition not the intended mother of the child to whom she has given 
birth. U.S. courts have adopted three different tests of parentage, roughly corresponding to this pluralization of 
pathways to maternity: the intent, genetic and gestational tests. For a recent discussion, see generally 
Anderson, supra note 114. No consensus approach can, however, be discerned either within the United States, 
where state policies towards surrogacy are quite varied, or internationally. 
 227 “The defining feature of matrilny is the assignment of individuals to culturally recognised categories 
whose membership is defined by descent traced through females.” LADISLAV HOLY, STRATEGIES AND NORMS 
IN A CHANGING MATRILINEAL SOCIETY. DESCENT, INHERITANCE, SUCCESSION AMONG THE TOKA OF ZAMBIA 2 
(1986) (internal citations omitted).  
 228 Benjamin F. Gruenbaum et al., Ovum Donation: Examining the New Israeli Law, 159 EUR. J. 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY & REPROD. BIOLOGY 40, 41 (2011). 
ERGAS GALLEYSPROOFS3 7/22/2013 9:33 AM 
2013] BABIES WITHOUT BORDERS 167 
appears to have been endorsed by numerous authorities.229 Under the Egg 
Donation Law (2010), in domestic cases the recipient of the donation is the 
mother of the child.230 Moreover, the woman who applies for permission to 
receive the donation is viewed as the “recipient,” and in a surrogacy 
arrangement, that person may be a commissioning party.231 
Israel is far from unique in its recent revisions to rules regarding filiation. 
At least twelve other countries have amended their laws since 2005.232 The 
unsettling of assumptions about parental identities is particularly salient in 
legal systems that recognize rules of jus sanguinis with respect to nationality 
and citizenship. Despite the moniker, jus sanguinis has not historically 
depended on blood but on legally cognizable relations.233 In both the civilian 
and common law traditions, nationality has until relatively recently passed 
primarily through the father and the father was not biologically defined.234 As 
the Roman maxim had it, pater est quem nuptiam demonstrant: The father is 
he who is evidenced by the nuptial, that is, the husband of the mother.235 The 
mother, however, was not the wife of the husband (which would have been 
tautological) but she who gave birth.236 Paternity, in this scheme, was the 
dependent variable—a function of the legal bond between a particular man and 
the woman who had gestated. Maternity was corporeal while paternity was not; 
nationality derived from the husband of the mother, not the male procreator of 
 
 229 Id. 
 230 Law Library of Congress, Israel Reproduction and Abortion: Law and Policy 6 (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/israel_2012-007460_IL_FINAL.pdf. 
 231 A recent judgment by a family court in Tel Aviv has determined that it is sufficient for a 
commissioning mother to demonstrate a genetic link to the child in order for a foreign birth certificate 
identifying her as the mother to be recognized as valid in Israel. See Ruth Retassie, Israel: Biological Mother 
Recognized as Parent in Landmark Surrogacy Case, BIONEWS (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.bionews.org.uk/ 
page_132763.asp. 
 232 See Hague Conference Report 2011, supra note 21, at 5 n.15. 
 233 Thus, for instance, in the United States until 1934, the citizenship of a child born abroad was attributed 
on the basis of paternity as determined in connection to marriage: If the mother was married, her husband was 
presumed to be the father, a principle followed in Roman times and in English common law. If the mother was 
unmarried, the child had no legally declared father or mother from whom to inherit, and could not claim U.S. 
citizenship through either parent. Children born abroad to a U.S. father and an alien secondary wife in a 
polygamous marriage, for example, were considered illegitimate and thus ineligible for jus sanguinis. Kristine 
S. Knaplund, Jus Sanguinis: Determining Citizenship for Assisted Reproduction Children Born Overseas 8 
(Pepperdine Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper, 2013) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2181026. 
 234 MAARTEN P. VINK & GERARD-RENÉ DE GROOT, BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP: TRENDS AND REGULATIONS 
IN EUROPE 6 (2010). 
 235 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1365 (9th ed. 2009). 
 236 Communiqué de la Première Présidence, supra note 201. 
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the child.237 Paradoxically, in the traditional view, “sanguinis,” though literally 
indicating “blood,” actually stood for “law.”238 
Today, paternity may be one of the most contested areas of law. In the 
United States, as elsewhere, the bases for the recognition of paternal status 
have been expanded, including through the increasing consideration of 
corporeal elements (sexual relations, sperm contribution).239 Paternity, in other 
words, no longer flows solely from the father’s legal relationship to the mother 
(or adoption), but may also be based on an autonomous biological and, 
sometimes, affective link to the child. In countries that allow for biologically 
based paternity without a commitment of the father to the gestating woman, 
commissioning fathers who are also sperm providers may be able to advance a 
jus sanguinis claim to nationality for their children. In fact, some states seem to 
be fashioning a remedy to the difficulties associated with the filiation of 
children born of surrogacy arrangements by recognizing the relevant foreign 
birth certificates as valid acts inasmuch as they establish the legal parentage of 
the intending father, in particular when he is genetically related to the child.240 
Moreover, even where the birth certificate does not support the recognition of 
paternity, paternity may sometimes be established on the basis of a legally 
regulated acknowledgment or act of recognition.241 But states’ receptivity to 
 
 237 Under Roman law, the concept of the pater familias was very broad and incorporated multiple 
pathways to filiation.  
 238 It might be objected that the widespread strictures against women’s marital infidelity were designed to 
ensure that “sanguinis” actually denoted the physical link between the father and the child. Indeed, under the 
Justininan Code, once a woman notified her husband that she was pregnant, he could either “send guards 
or . . . give notice to her that she is not pregnant by him. . . . [U]nless he sends guards or replies giving her 
notice she is not pregnant by him, the husband is compelled to acknowledge the offspring.” Knaplund, supra 
note 233. But this objection fails to take into account the near-impossibility of either children born outside of 
marriage or men who had fathered children to women married to other men to bring paternity suits well into 
the twentieth century. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (denying a filiation action filed by a 
man who sought to prove his paternity of a child born out of wedlock because of a rebuttable presumption that 
that a child of born to a married woman is the child of the husband of that woman). A recent German lower 
court reiterated the primacy of legal relations with respect to the establishment of paternity at least where 
surrogacy is involved, even though jus sanguinis rules would normally apply. Nisha Satkunarajah, Surrogate 
Child Denied German Passport, BIONEWS (May 9, 2011), http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_94158.asp. The 
court sustained the German Embassy’s right to deny nationality to children born of a German father (who 
would normally be entitled to transmit his citizenship to his offspring) and an Indian gestational carrier. Id. 
According to press accounts, the court held that under German law “the legal father of a child born to a 
surrogate is considered to be the surrogate mother’s husband not the biological father . . . in this case the 
biological father’s German citizenship was legally irrelevant.” Id.  
 239 See Hague Conference Report 2012, supra note 4, at 13–23. 
 240 Id. at 21. 
 241 Hague Conference Report 2012, supra note 4, at 22 nn.130–32 (citing Amtsgericht [AG] District 
Court Nuremnberg Dec. 14, 2009, UR III 0264/09, UR III 264/09 (Ger.).  
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such claims is not universally assured, as the Balaz case and others attest.242 
Moreover, it leaves unresolved the question of the attribution of maternity, 
often resulting in a situation of “limping parentage” whereby no legal avenue 
for the recognition of the second parent—now, generally, the commissioning 
mother—is available.243 
Even as the bases for paternity recognition have been liberalized, laws 
allowing mothers to transmit nationality have also been promulgated in many 
states, thus extending jus sanguinis rules to maternal descent.244 Here the 
assumption has been that the jus sanguinis describes an actual physical link 
between the mother and the child: The mother and child share a corporeal 
connection, metonymically described by “blood.” As the Israeli case 
illustrates, however, legal systems now confront the question of deciding to 
which aspect of corporeality, if any, they will attach the status of 
motherhood—gestation or ova provision. 
The issues regarding parental identities reverberate with values profoundly 
held by domestic constituencies as well as with constitutional norms, and these 
may not easily align even with widely-recognized state interests. Nonetheless, 
international market players, whether importers or exporters, will generally 
privilege the commissioning parties over ova contributors and gestational 
carriers and thus reduce the significance attributed to the corporeal elements of 
maternity. Legislation that treats the gestational carrier as a direct analog of an 
adoption birth mother—for instance, granting her a period of time in which to 
revise her decision with respect to renouncing maternal rights—or that 
establishes the unenforceability of surrogacy contracts, enhances the risk that a 
gestational carrier may “hold up” the commissioning parties while also 
 
 242 See Balaz v. Anand Municipality, supra note 9; Satkunarajah, supra note 238; Surrogate Children 
Have No Right to German Passport, Court Rules, supra note 62. 
 243 See Hague Conference Report 2012, supra note 4, at 20 (discussing “limping parentage” by citing 
research of twelve sets of French commissioning parents and one Belgian commissioning father, wherein 
children were living with at least one (if not two) “unrecognized” parent).  
 244 CEDAW, supra note 211. For states that either restrict or entirely deny the ability of the mother to 
transmit her nationality to a child, see the states that have entered reservations to art. 9(2) of the Convention 
for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which provides that “States Parties shall 
grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children.” Id. In the United States, in 
the early twentieth century unwed mothers of children born overseas were accorded a right to transmit their 
nationality analogous to that previously reserved to married fathers or fathers who legitimated their illegitimate 
children. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 465 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The State Department 
“reason[ed] that, for the child born out of wedlock, the mother ‘stands in place of the father.’” Id. In 1934, 
Congress attributed the right to transmit citizenship on a basis of equality with men. Id. 
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exposing her to risks of coercion.245 But legislation like the Israeli Egg 
Donation Law cited earlier, which establishes that the mother is the recipient of 
the egg donation and that in surrogacy cases the recipient is the commissioning 
party, at once bolsters transactional certainty and weakens the negotiating 
ability of the gestational carrier.246 
In keeping with rules designed to foster markets, the most coherent way for 
states engaged in the surrogacy market to address the question of maternal jus 
sanguinis rights appears to be by “legalizing” the “blood” of the mother—that 
is, by substituting the corporeal bond of mother and child with a legal bond (as 
per the Israeli case). Motherhood becomes, then, a status whose basis lies in 
state validation of contractual accords between the commissioning parent 
and—separately—the ova provider and the gestational carrier. To the extent to 
which both surrogacy and adoption rest on an intent-based test of parenthood, 
the gestational carrier is the analog of the mother who gives up her child for 
adoption.247 But, unlike the birth mother in adoption, the gestational carrier in 
surrogacy has never had the status of mother. Consequently, she has never 
been bound by any of the obligations nor has she ever had any of the rights 
normally attendant on giving birth, and she may be compensated at a market 
rate. In this scenario, two rules are established within one regulatory 
framework. Special rules apply to women who give birth to, and to those who 
subsequently gain parental status with respect to, children born in surrogacy 
arrangements; general rules apply to mothers giving birth outside of such 
arrangements.248 
C. One Regime (Complex), Two Treaty Zones 
1. A Permissive Treaty Zone: Between Maximalist Aspirations and 
Minimalist Possibilities 
If, generally, how states define the nexus between the corporeal and the 
legal attributes of maternity both reflects and determines the position they 
occupy in the market for reproductive surrogacy, a dualistic regime seems 
likely to emerge. One part would be composed of states whose filiation 
 
 245 Hague Conference Report 2012, supra note 4, at 17 (reporting an incident in Ukraine allegedly 
involving extortion by criminal gangs). 
 246 See also ART Draft Bill, supra note 77. 
 247 On the intent-based test of parenthood, see supra note 114and accompanying text. 
 248 See Comm. of Ministers of the Council of Eur., Steering Comm. on Bioethics, Rep. on its 39th Mtg., 
Nov. 30–Dec. 3, 2010 (Jan. 24, 2011), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1735853&Site=CM. 
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policies enable them to recognize reproductive surrogacy formally, legalize it, 
and generally further their market shares. The other part would be composed of 
more restrictive rules designed to suppress commissioned births. The states 
allowing surrogacy might constitute a “permissive treaty zone,” where 
comprehensive agreements would govern a wide range of issues, from the 
specific attribution of parentage to the allocation of decision-making capacity 
over the continuation or termination of a pregnancy—including the 
circumstances (if any) under which commissioning parties could enforce 
clauses obligating a gestational carrier to abort a fetus—and the scope, 
structure, and timing of allowable compensation, including the rules regarding 
payment to brokers and providers of medical and custodial services and 
entitlements to insurance coverage. Such agreements would also detail state 
obligations, from ascertaining and certifying the consensual bases and formal 
validity of transactions to establishing and regulating access to records 
identifying the “biological contributors” (or their genetic traits) of the children 
born of surrogacy arrangements; from the implementation of means to obviate 
coercion of gestational carriers and gamete donors to ensuring their health care 
and living conditions; from the establishment of international coordination and 
monitoring systems to the specification of dispute resolution mechanisms for 
both individuals and states. 
Less comprehensive treaties could also be reached within this zone, 
allowing signatories to agree on central matters such as state responsibility for 
the legality of transactions, as well as process issues while adopting their own 
definitions of maternity, contractual requirements, and procedural 
mechanisms.249 Borrowing from the Adoption Convention, such a surrogacy 
agreement might require states to establish a central authority (or to accredit 
non-state bodies) to perform the monitoring and certification processes that 
would ensure a basic set of arrangements: For example, that the “importing” 
state (i.e., the state of the commissioning parties) be prepared to recognize the 
filiation of the children born of surrogacy arrangements before the necessary 
transactions are entered into, that the treatment of the gestational carrier and 
 
 249 See Katarina Trimmings & Paul Beaumont, International Surrogacy Arrangements: An Urgent Need 
for Legal Regulation at the International Level, 7 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 627, 635 (2011) (explaining the direction 
recently proposed by the organizers of the Aberdeen conference referred to above). Cf. Hague Conference 
Report 2012, supra note 6 (suggesting that this direction is a likely path); accord Comm. of Experts on Family 
Law, Draft Instrument on the Rights and Legal Status of Children and Parental Responsibilities 2, CDCJ 
(2011) 15 (Apr. 20, 2010). But see Comm. of Ministers of the Council of Eur., supra note 248, paras. 22–24 
(questioning the phrase “regardless of genetic connection” and recommending that states’ freedom to provide 
special arrangements regarding maternal filiation be limited). 
ERGAS GALLEYSPROOFS3 7/22/2013 9:33 AM 
172 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 
genetic contributors be free of coercion, that these parties be ensured health 
care and the gestational carrier provided adequate living conditions, and that a 
process for the recognition of filiation be established.250 Again, on the model 
of the Adoption Convention, the agreement might require states to take action 
where a breach is seriously threatened or actually occurs.251 Such an agreement 
would assign a high degree of autonomy to state parties, formally relying on 
monitoring and reporting mechanisms to ensure enforcement without 
providing for a mechanism allowing individual complaints to be received, 
although—on the model of human rights treaties252—a procedure to hear such 
complaints might be established through a successive optional protocol. But in 
the first instance, the agreement’s success would depend on the state parties’ 
mutual interest in ensuring smoothly flowing transactions rather than on 
systems imposing quasi (or actual) judicial accountability. 
2. A Prohibitionist Treaty Zone: Between Criminalization and Cooperation 
States that disallow surrogacy would presumably be limited to seeking to 
control cross-border transactions or only allowing their citizens to access 
internationally services that are prohibited domestically. Attempts at control 
could take the form of agreements under international law. States in a 
“prohibitionist treaty zone” might, for instance, pursue a criminalizing 
convention on the model of the Palermo Protocols against human 
trafficking.253 Or prohibitionist states could promote agreements (multilateral 
 
 250 See Adoption Convention, supra note 61, art. 6, on the structural cooperation model embedded in the 
Convention. See Hague Conference Report 2012, supra note 4, at 27, for an authoritative proposal for a 
cooperative framework. 
 251 Adoption Convention, supra note 61, art. 33.  
 252 See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 32. 
 253 See Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 
U.N.T.S. 319 [hereinafter Palermo Protocol I]; Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and 
Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 
2241 U.N.T.S. 507 [hereinafter Palermo Protocol II]. But see Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from 
Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and Anti-trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655 (2010) 
(critiquing the criminal law approach to human trafficking embedded in the Palermo Protocols). On an 
individual level, even among states in which some surrogacy arrangements are legal, several criminalize any 
surrogacy arrangement that either does not comport with existing regulations or that entails commercial 
transactions (as would generally apply to international transactions). States that criminalize all non-conforming 
transactions include Greece and Israel; states in which criminal sanctions focus on commercial arrangements 
include certain states of Australia, Canada, China, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Hague Conference 
Report 2012, supra note 4, at 11 and n.62. There is, at present, no indication of a movement towards a 
criminalizing convention, although reports suggest that some states, such as Italy and Australia, are now more 
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or bilateral) with permissive states, requiring that the latter actively seek to 
prevent transactions involving their citizens. Evidence of such a trend may be 
found in a joint letter sent by Consuls General of eight European states 
requesting that Indian IVF clinics desist from providing surrogacy services to 
their nationals unless such nationals had consulted with their own embassies 
first.254 In a similar vein, prohibitionist states could seek to influence the 
design of a permissive treaty. They might negotiate agreements designed to 
ensure that any accord legalizing international surrogacy assign responsibility 
for preventively verifying the status of surrogacy in the home states of the 
commissioning parties to those states in which surrogacy is to be performed: 
for example, either by requiring certifications from all potential commissioning 
parties or by maintaining a list of prohibited jurisdictions, from which 
providers would be required not to accept clients. Violations could then be 
interpreted as breaches under the law of state responsibility rather than (or as 
well as) individually culpable acts. Thus, the Indian draft law’s requirement 
that commissioning parties produce documentation of their own state’s 
willingness to allow the child to be born of the surrogacy arrangement would 
become an element of international law.255 
3. Mutual Recognition, Implied Cooperation, and Reciprocal Advantage: 
One Regime from Two Zones 
But prohibitionist states could also—either implicitly or explicitly—use 
permissive states as a “safety valve” for their internal demand, just as 
permissive states could profit from satisfying that demand, capitalizing on the 
higher prices associated with a limited supply. In the French Mennesson case, 
for example, the plaintiffs complained that under international human rights 
law the children’s best interest required recognition of their filiation and that 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, their right to their family 
 
actively prosecuting illegal surrogacy arrangements, even when entered into extraterritorially. Id. at 22 nn.149, 
152. 
 254 Hague Conference Report 2012, supra note 4, at 25. The Consuls General involved were those of 
Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Id. 
 255 ART Draft Bill, supra note 77. It should also be noted that the Draft Bill indicates that prospective 
parents from states prohibiting surrogacy would no longer be able to access Indian surrogacy services. Id. 
§ 34(19)(a). On a domestic level, several states already require commissioning parties to seek prospective 
approval prior to entering into the relevant transactions even on a domestic level. See Hague Conference 
Report 2012, supra note 4, at 11 n.62 (referencing certain states in Australia and Greece, Israel, South Africa, 
and New Zealand). 
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life, privacy, and home demanded respect.256 The Cour de Cassation rebutted 
that argument by holding that the annulment of the transcription of the 
children’s birth certificates into the French registries did not deprive the 
children of their maternal and paternal filiation as recognized under California 
law and, hence, also did not deprive them of the possibility of living with the 
plaintiffs themselves.257 Therefore, the Cassation’s own decision neither 
interfered unduly with the children’s right to a family life nor ran counter to 
the principle of their best interests.258 In other words, France’s prohibitionist 
posture was authorized by the United States’ permissive legislation. 
Prohibitionist states will surely continue to generate internal demand for 
surrogacy services that they themselves deem illicit, and permissive states will 
continue to service that demand, each side negotiating (and acting) in full 
consciousness of the other’s positions.259 As the Cour de Cassation explained, 
the regulatory regime is constituted by France and the United States, by a 
prohibitionist jurisdiction and a permissive jurisdiction functioning together on 
the basis of “stable mutual expectations about [each] others’ patterns of 
behavior,” as an integrated whole.260 The Cassation’s decision may be reversed 
 
 256 See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], 1e civ., Apr. 6, 2011, Bull. civ. I, 
No. 72 (Fr.). 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id.  
[U]une telle annulation, qui ne prive pas les enfants de la filiation maternelle et paternelle que le 
droit californien leur reconnaît ni ne les empêche de vivre avec les époux X . . . en France, ne 
porte pas atteinte au droit au respect de la vie privée et familiale de ces enfant au sens de l’article 
8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, non plus qu’à leur intérêt supérieur 
garanti par . . . la Convention internationale des droits de l’enfant. . . .  
Id. The Court adopted precisely the same stance (using the same language) in another case regarding a 
surrogacy contract under Minnesota law. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], 1e 
civ., Apr. 6, 2011, Bull. civ. I, No. 70 (Fr.). 
 259 See Fiona Govan, Ban on Surrogacy Creates Trade in ‘Wombs for Rent,’ TELEGRAPH (Aug. 1, 2006), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1525347/Ban-on-surrogacy-creates-trade-in-wombs-for-rent.html (giving 
examples of the ways in which prohibitionist policies may promote the development of clandestine markets); 
see also Richard F. Storrow, Quests for Conception: Fertility Tourists, Globalization and Feminist Legal 
Theory, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 295, 300–01 (2005) (discussing the opportunistic behavior that legal differentiation 
favors at an individual level). Permissive states also generate prohibited exchanges: For example, a U.S. 
lawyer created an inventory of available babies by exporting American gestational carriers to Ukraine, where 
they were impregnated with sperm from anonymous donors. Calif. Lawyer Sentenced in International Baby 
Selling Scam, USA TODAY (Feb. 25, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-02-
24/Surrogacy-lawyer-sentenced/53238442/1. When the pregnancies reached the second trimester, the lawyer 
offered the future children to clients for $100,000, presenting them as the products of surrogacy contracts that 
had fallen through. Id. 
 260 KEOHANE, supra note 219, at 89. Keohane and Victor have argued that segmented, partially 
overlapping accords can operate together to create a multilayered “regime complex” that regulates a particular 
issue area. Keohane & Victor, supra note 215. Such a complex may be constituted by loosely coupled 
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on appeal to the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”).261 But it may 
also be sustained under the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, which 
allows states latitude in the interpretation of obligations, in particular with 
respect to issues on which national legal frameworks diverge significantly.262 
Moreover, the ECHR could concur with the Cassation’s logic—predicating the 
viability of the French refusal to legitimate the filiation of children born of 
surrogacy arrangements on the parents’ and children’s effective access to other 
jurisdictions that provide the requisite recognitions. Were it to adopt this 
approach, the Court would follow the precedent it set when it based the 
compatibility of Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation with the Convention 
on the fact that prospective seekers of abortion services within Ireland could 
lawfully obtain information regarding the availability of such services abroad 
and travel to access them.263 Thus, the ECHR would construct a regime in 
which the legality of prohibitionist states’ policies depends upon the existence 
and accessibility of permissive ones, each operating in relation to the other in 
an integrated whole.264 Whether or not the Court adopts this stance, the fully 
globalized characteristics of the international commercial surrogacy market 
ensure that prohibitionist and permissive jurisdictions will continue to coexist 
in an uneasy tension based on mutual acknowledgement and implicit 
coordination. 
 
elements, including conflicting ones. Id. In my view, with respect to international commercial surrogacy, the 
dynamic linkage between permissive and prohibitionist states can result in what is effectively and sometimes 
avowedly, although not formally, an integrated system rather than a loose regulatory complex. See Charles M. 
Blow, Friend With Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2011, at A21, for a recent example of states’ strategic use of 
arms dealers. See YASMINE ERGAS, NELLE MAGLIE DELLA POLITICA (1986), for a history of abortion 
campaigns that utilized extraterritorial services to create pressure on restrictive domestic policies.  
 261 See Mennesson v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/ 
search.aspx?i=001-110100. 
 262 The Mennesson appeal to the European Court of Human Rights alleges that France is in violation of 
articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention. Id. A recent decision by the Court, which also invoked these 
articles, found that France’s foreclosure of same-sex second parent adoption in the context of assisted 
reproductive technologies was compatible with the doctrine of the margin of appreciation. See Affaire Gas and 
Dubois v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i= 
001-109572. The Court specifically debated—and in the majority rejected—arguments based on the best 
interests of the child. It should be noted, however, that in that case, parentage of the child under French law by 
one parent was already established (the birth mother being recognized as the legal mother). Id.  
 263 A, B and C v. Ireland, para. 241, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/ 
pages/search.aspx?i=001-102332. 
 264 It should be noted that, from this perspective, while the existence of a permissive jurisdiction is 
essential to the legality of a prohibitionist one, the reverse does not apply: all jurisdictions may be permissive, 
but not all jurisdictions may be prohibitionist.  
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D. The Test of Human Rights 
1. Does Human Rights Law Require Either a Prohibitionist or a Permissive 
Stance? Re-reading the Balaz Case Through the Lens of the Best 
Interests of the Child 
Whatever the ultimate shape of the regime that emerges, the question of its 
compatibility with international human rights law will arise. Surrogacy raises 
fundamental issues—the nature of personhood and the attributes of human 
dignity, individual autonomy and the perimeters of choice, the distinction 
between what can be made an object of commerce, what must remain in the 
domain of gift, and what ought not to be transferred at all. In the lexicon of 
human rights law, these issues resonate with norms regarding the 
commercialization of human bodily products and services;265 the sale of 
children;266 the rights of women to employment267 and to “liberty and security 
of person”;268 the rights of children to grow up in a “family environment” and 
to see that decisions concerning them be guided by their “best interests;”269 the 
rights of children not to be discriminated on the basis of their parentage270 and 
not to be separated from their parents against their will unless competent 
authorities have determined that such separation is necessary to safeguard the 
child’s best interests;271 the rights of adults to form a family without unjustified 
state interference in their privacy and their homes;272 and the protection of 
maternity and the promotion of its “proper understanding.”273 Moreover, risks 
of abuse loom large: When young women are persuaded to “donate” ova 
without being fully informed of the (largely understudied) risks that may 
accompany the relevant hormonal treatments and surgeries; when women work 
as gestators, because they have been trafficked or pressured by relatives or 
 
 265 Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 139, art. 3. 
 266 Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography, art. 2(a), G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (Mar. 16, 
2001) [hereinafter Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children] 
(“Sale of children means any act or transaction whereby a child is transferred by any person or group of 
persons to another for remuneration or any other consideration.”).  
 267 CEDAW, supra note 211, art. 11. 
 268 ICCPR, supra note 169, art. 9. 
 269 CRC, supra note 203, art. 20. 
 270 Id. art. 3. 
 271 Id. art. 9. 
 272 ICCPR, supra note 169, art. 17.  
 273 CEDAW, supra note 211, art. 5. 
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simply as a way out of crushing poverty and unemployment;274 when 
commissioning parties are held hostage by gestational carriers or brokers who 
exact higher prices to “deliver” children than had been previously agreed or by 
border guards and consular authorities who extort fees for either performing 
legal duties or ignoring unspoken but recognized illegalities. In these instances, 
too, human rights norms come into play, either by defining standards, such as 
that to the “highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”275 that 
may be flagrantly violated, or by setting obligations upon states to prevent, 
prosecute, and punish particular behaviors, including human trafficking276 and 
corruption.277 
Can these many norms guide policymakers in determining the compliance 
of a particular treaty with human rights?278 Even more fundamentally, does 
human rights law require either a prohibitionist or a permissive stance? Under 
general international law, the “principle of harmonization” prescribes that 
“when several norms bear on a single issue they should, to the extent possible, 
be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of obligations.”279 But this 
principle is only of limited assistance in regard to reproductive surrogacy, for 
the panoply of norms potentially implicated does not align in a neat regulatory 
scheme. Some rights may conflict. For example, the right of a gestator to 
“security of person” and hence to determine the progress, or termination, of her 
pregnancy versus the right of commissioning parties to the performance of 
contractual agreements that may require that the pregnancy be carried to term 
or, alternatively, ended under only certain conditions.280 Moreover, key terms 
 
 274 See Doctor Involved in Surrogate Mother Case Gets Probation, FOCUS TAIWAN NEWS 
CHANNEL(February 22, 2011), http://focustaiwan.tw/ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?ID=201102220049& 
Type=aSOC, and Weena Kowitjwani, Thai Organization Involved in Trafficking in Vietnamese Surrogate 
Mothers Uncovered, ASIANEWS.IT (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Thai-organisation-
involved-in-trafficking-in-Vietnamese-surrogate-mothers-uncovered-20916.html, for instances of trafficking 
for the purpose of surrogacy that have been reported in Taiwan and Vietnam. Numerous other cases of abuse 
and trafficking related to surrogacy have also been documented, leading to international attempts to 
promulgate rules specifically criminalizing such conduct. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
Model Law Against Trafficking in Persons, http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/UNODC_ 
Model_Law_on_Trafficking_in_Persons.pdf (providing commentary to article 2(f) that states may consider 
criminalizing as a form of exploitation “[t]he use of women as surrogate mothers”). 
 275 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 174, art. 12. 
 276 See Palermo Protocol I, supra note 253, art. 2. 
 277 See Convention Against Corruption, pmbl., Oct. 31, 2003, 2348 U.N.T.S. 41. 
 278 See Barbara Stark, Transnational Surrogacy and International Human Rights, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 369 (2012), for a review of some of the pertinent issues. 
 279 Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 11, 2006, para. 4, U.N. Doc. 
A/61/10; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2006). 
 280 ICCPR, supra note 169, art. 9. 
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are often undefined. Sales of children may be prohibited, but what constitutes a 
sale? Does payment to a gestational carrier of “reasonable expenses” that 
amount to at least—if not more—than the average income she might earn in 
other forms of employment represent a wage and, hence, consideration for a 
service performed or for the actual goods delivered, that is, the child itself?281 
If a child has a right to develop in a family environment, how should that 
environment be defined and by whom? If maternity is to be protected, and the 
understanding of its function promoted, of what does it consist—ova provision, 
gestation, nurturing—and what would protection entail? And, finally, if 
children are not to be separated from their parents save for compelling reasons 
related to the latter’s best interests, who are the parents? 
Consider how the “best interests of the child” principle—a principle legally 
declared to be in a hierarchically superior position to all other principles and 
rules where children are concerned282—might have been applied in the Balaz 
case. If nationality and filiation are prima facie matters for individual states to 
determine, Germany and India would have had an equal right to assign or deny 
the family status and hence to confer or withhold citizenship of the twins. But 
the German rule regarding filiation, barring recognition of the Balazes’ 
parentage of the twins, prevented attribution of German nationality. From a 
practical perspective, with expatriation toward Germany of the twins as 
members of the Balaz family impossible, the children faced a substantial risk 
of becoming wards of the Indian state. That risk could have been obviated by 
the “original” Indian rule in the case (i.e. prior to the court decision assigning 
 
 281 See Adoption Convention, supra note 59. The Adoption Convention allows for payment of 
“reasonable expenses,” but recent reviews of the implementation of the Convention acknowledge that such 
payments often function as surreptitious forms of compensation for the transfer of parental rights. Id. The 
Secretary of the Hague Conference on Private International Law has noted: “The connection between money 
and intercountry adoption is a fact of life and it is better to acknowledge that and try to regulate it.” Jennifer 
Degeling, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Nordic Adoption Council Meeting, Reykjavik, Ice., 
Sept. 4–5, 2009, The Intercountry Adoption to Good Practice Revisited: Good Practice and Real Practice 
[hereinafter Good Practice and Real Practice]. There is no agreed parameter for determining “reasonable 
expenses,” which can, in some instances, include lost income if the surrogate was previously employed (e.g., 
Greece) and compensation for “pain and suffering” (e.g., Israel). See Hague Conference Report 2012, supra 
note 4, at 12 n.66. 
 282 CRC, supra note 203, art. 3 (“In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or 
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”). But see Elizabeth B. Crawford & Janeen M. 
Carruthers, The Place of Religion in Family Law: The International Private Law Imperative, in THE PLACE OF 
RELIGION IN FAMILY LAW: A COMPARATIVE SEARCH 37, 65–65 (Jane Mair et al. eds., 2011), for a discussion 
of the exceptions introduced by private law agreements—specifically, in relation to child abduction—that 
establish conflicts rules that privilege other principles, in particular in relation to the child’s domicile in U.K. 
jurisprudence. 
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maternal status to the gestational carrier), which recognized the parentage of 
the commissioning parties. Had Germany acquiesced to transcribing the birth 
certificates as initially issued, which named Susan Lohle as the mother and Jan 
Balaz as the father, the children would immediately have had the “family 
environment” required by international human rights law.283 The Indian rule as 
first applied would therefore have easily comported with the “best interests” 
principle. As noted earlier, the preamble of the Convention of the Rights of the 
Child provides that a child “should grow up in a family environment”284 and 
further describes “the family, as the fundamental group of society and the 
natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and 
particularly children,” signaling the fundamental importance assigned to family 
settings.285 The Convention also closely links participation in a family 
environment to the best interests of the child. Article 20 of the Convention can 
be read as embedding a rebuttable presumption that the best interests of the 
child are to be understood as entailing the integration of the child in his or her 
own family environment.286 The withdrawal of the child from his family 
environment in order to safeguard his best interests is posited as an exception 
to the general principle that the child will normally be integrated in such an 
environment. As applied to the Balaz case, then, harmonization of filiation and 
nationality rules with the best interests principle could be seen as requiring 
acceptance of the “original” Indian position on filiation and, hence, a 
permissive posture with respect to surrogacy. 
Faced with children actually at risk of being denied family life and status, 
and therefore being stateless, some courts and policymakers have invoked the 
“best interests of the child” to legitimate filiations that would otherwise run 
counter to prohibitionist national public policies. Reaching such a conclusion, 
UK High Court Judge Hedley commented on his own discomfort in making a 
parental order in the context of an international surrogacy agreement. The 
court, he wrote, must “balance two competing and potentially irreconcilably 
conflicting concepts,”287 Parliament’s entitlement to prohibit surrogacy versus 
consideration of a child’s welfare. “The difficulty is that it is almost impossible 
to imagine a set of circumstances in which by the time the case comes to court, 
the welfare of any child (particularly a foreign child) would not be gravely 
 
 283 CRC, supra note 203, pmbl., art. 20. 
 284 Id. pmbl. 
 285 Id. 
 286 Id. art. 20 (“A child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment, or in whose 
own best interests cannot be allowed to remain in that environment . . . .”). 
 287 Re X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy), [2008] EWHC (Fam) 3030 [para. 24] (Eng.). 
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compromised (at the very least) by a refusal to make an order . . . . The point of 
admission to this country is in some ways the final opportunity in reality to 
prevent the effective implementation of a commercial surrogacy agreement.”288  
But other courts have adopted a contrasting view. Some have subordinated the 
“best interests” principle to the legality of the context in which it is being 
applied: Faced with a commissioning mother’s request to adopt the child born 
of a surrogate mother and the father’s consent to such an adoption, the 
provincial Court of Quebec refused to allow the adoption to proceed because 
all surrogacy is prohibited in Quebec and commercial surrogacy (at issue in 
this case) is prohibited throughout Canada.289 The Court noted that the father’s 
consent could not cure the illegality of the transactions underlying the child’s 
birth and cited authorities for the proposition that “‘the actual best interests of 
the child is not an autonomous standard of law in itself, it is a rule of 
interpretation that presupposes the legality of the process’” and that “[t]he best 
interests of the child, however important a notion it may be, is not a catch-all 
argument justifying everything and its opposite.”290 The Court concluded that 
“[t]his child is not entitled to a maternal filiation at any cost. For the Court to 
give effect to the father’s authorization for the adoption of his child would be, 
under the circumstances, to show willful blindness and confirm that the end 
justifies the means.”291 In a more nuanced decision, the French Cour de 
Cassation deciding the Mennesson case also found that the “best interest” test 
did not require French recognition of the children’s filiation, which the court 
 
 288 Id. See also CA (Bari) 13.febbraio.2009, available at: http://www.minoriefamiglia.it/download/ca_ 
bari_13022009.PDF, in which an Italian court held on appeal that, in a donor surrogacy case regarding 
recognition of a U.K. parental order that conferred parentage on commissioning parents, deference to the 
principle of the best interest of the child—which “in the case at issue . . . indisputably [entails] the 
recognition . . . [in Italy] of the foreign decisions [regarding parentage]”—was not contrary to the international 
public order that the Italian court was required to evaluate. Inter alia, the Court noted that the concept of 
“public order” that was to be taken into account regarded the international public order and could not be 
limited to a view of public order based on Italian national law; that the gestational carrier had not been paid for 
the gestation; that the children had been born before prohibitionist Italian legislation had come into effect. The 
court did not discuss whether the “best interest of the child” understood as requiring recognition of the foreign 
parentage order would have prevailed had a commercial surrogacy been agreement been involved. 
 289 In re X, [2009] R.J.Q. 445, para. 78 (Can.). 
 290 Id. paras. 69–70. 
Unless one chooses to wear blinders . . . it is not possible to dissociate the question of the validity 
of this consent from the preceding steps concocted by this couple in carrying out their parental 
project. The consent was vitiated because it formed part and parcel of an illegal undertaking and 
was contrary to the public order. 
Id. para. 57. 
 291 Id. paras. 77–78. 
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viewed as legalizing ex post facto surrogacy practices specifically prohibited 
by French understandings of the “ordre publique international.”292 
Along lines somewhat analogous to those put forth by the Cour de 
Cassation regarding California’s filiation rules, a court hearing the Balaz case 
might consider that so long as the children’s filiation were recognized in India, 
nothing in German law prevented the Balazes from providing the children with 
a family environment, in India or elsewhere (including, perhaps, in Germany if 
a way were found to bring them into the country). Such a court might further 
consider the particular basis of the filiation irrelevant to determining whether 
the children’s “best interests” were being served (that is, whether under Indian 
filiation law parentage were assigned to both commissioning parties or only to 
the biological father cum commissioning party and to the gestational carrier). 
Alternatively, it might determine that so long as a “family environment” could 
be ensured, the German state was entitled to balance its interest in determining 
filiation policy in accordance with particular values against the “best interest” 
of the children to a family environment specifically constructed around the 
commissioning parties as their parents in the country of the commissioning 
parties’ citizenship.293 In short, if the alternative is between children becoming 
wards of the state and children being integrated into a family environment, the 
“best interests” principle will require the latter choice. But when more than one 
family environment is available, determining which particular configuration of 
parents (genetically related contributors, gestational carrier, spouse of the 
gestational carrier, contractually identified intended parent(s)) most closely 
comports with the best interests principle can involve courts in case-specific 
determinations in which they balance claims advanced by commissioning 
parents and their children against state interests in pursuing particular public 
policies. As the Mennesson and Quebec cases so vividly demonstrate, at least 
some judicial authorities will find it possible to reconcile the best interests 
principle with a prohibitionist stance toward surrogacy. 
 
 292 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], 1e civ., Apr. 6, 2011, Bull. civ. I, No. 
72 (Fr.). The Conseil d’Etat subsequently ordered the release of a laissez passer to twins born of an Indian 
surrogate and a French father, so as to enable the twins to enter France. CE, May 4, 2011, Juge des referes, 
348778 (Fr.).The Conseil stressed the provisional nature of the document to be released and noted that the 
filiation of the children—the French father and the Indian gestational carrier—was uncontested, and that the 
illegality of the surrogacy contract under French law did not obviate the state’s obligation to accord 
“primordial importance” to the children’s best interest. Id. Although this could be indicative of a difference of 
views with respect to the Cassation, it should be noted that the Conseil also recognized the ultimate 
competence of the French courts (rather than the administrative judicial body) to determine the validity of the 
children’s filiation with respect to the conferral of nationality. Id. 
 293 See also Re X and Y, [2008] EWHC, para. 24. 
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2. Can a Treaty on International Commercial Surrogacy Survive Jus 
Cogens Scrutiny? 
Harmonization would be moot if either permissive or prohibitionist treaties 
(or both) were viewed as violating jus cogens norms, for treaties that 
contravene such prohibitions, as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
specifies, are void ab initio.294 Such violations could arise in at least three 
distinct ways: if the object and purpose of the treaty run counter to jus cogens; 
if particular operational clauses in a permissive treaty run counter to jus cogens 
and if the substantive result entailed by the application of a prohibitionist treaty 
requires considering the treaty itself as de facto violative of peremptory norms. 
a. Permissive Treaties and the Problem of the Sale of Children 
Would a permissive treaty that configures the central transactions involved 
in reproductive surrogacy as a sale of children, either through an explicit use of 
terminology associated with sales (“price,” “consideration,” “payment”) or 
because it de facto provides for a do ut des involving the exchange of 
compensation for the transfer of the child, run counter to jus cogens norms? 
There is an evident trend in international law toward the prohibition of the sale 
of persons. In addition to prohibitions on slavery295 and human trafficking,296 
sales of children are explicitly banned by the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child,297 and the reduction of sales of children figures prominently among the 
 
 294 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 295 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 7 U.S.T. 479, 226 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Supplementary Slavery 
Convention]; Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 212 U.N.T.S. 17 [hereinafter Slavery 
Convention]. 
 296 Palermo Protocol I, supra note 253; Palermo Protocol II, supra note 253. 
 297 “States Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent the 
abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose or in any form.” CRC, supra note 203, art. 35; 
see also Optional Protocol, supra note 266. The preamble of the Optional Protocol expresses the Parties 
“grave” concern “at the significant and increasing international traffic in children for the purpose of the sale of 
children, child prostitution and child pornography.” Id. This tripartite enumeration—sale, prostitution, and 
pornography—indicates a distinct preoccupation with the sale of children in general and not only with sales for 
the particular purposes of prostitution or pornography. “Sale” is further defined in the Optional Protocol as 
follows: “any act or transaction whereby a child is transferred by any person or group of persons to another for 
remuneration or any other compensation.” Id. art. 2(a). National legislations on adoption have reiterated the 
prohibition against any form of compensation, also incorporating a similar definition of “sale.” Thus, in 2001, 
the French Civil Code was amended to provide that the consent of the legal representative of the child to the 
adoption must be given freely, and obtained without any consideration. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 370-3 (Fr.). 
The Penal Code of Morocco was amended in 2003 to criminalize all sales of children, the sale of a child being 
defined as “any act or transaction that produces the transfer of a child from any person or group of persons to 
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motivations of the Adoption Convention.298 Arguably, the entire thrust of 
international human rights law, from its recurrent references to human dignity 
to the specific claims detailed in the various declarations and conventions, 
militates against any, no matter how momentary, reduction of a person to a 
conveyable object of exchange: At issue is the status of human beings per 
se.299 
Are all exchanges of humans for consideration legally equivalent? 
Historically, the sale of humans has been most prominently addressed in the 
context of slavery. As the 1926 Convention on Slavery specified and the 1956 
Supplementary Convention reiterated, a slave has “the status or condition of a 
person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership 
are exercised, and ‘slave’ means a person in such condition or status.”300 Here, 
the term “ownership” denotes the commodification of the human being 
involved. But the Supplementary Convention also details—and proscribes—
several conditions “similar to slavery,”301 which provide a lens through which 
the connection between slavery and the sale of humans may be more closely 
examined. Serfdom entails both an obligation to live and labor on the land of 
another and the inability of the person under such obligation to change his 
status.302 Forced marriage regards the giving (or promise thereto) of a woman 
“without the right to refuse” in marriage in exchange for payment “of a 
consideration in money or in kind.”303 Child exploitation involves: 
Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the 
age of 18 years, is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or 
 
another person or group of persons against remuneration or any other advantage.” Morocco Penal Code art. 
467-1, as amended by Act No. 24-03 of Nov. 11, 2003. 
 298 See G. PARRA-ARANGUREN, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE CONVENTION ON PROTECTION OF 
CHILDREN AND CO-OPERATION IN RESPECT OF INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 3 (1993), http://www.hcch.net/ 
upload/expl33e.pdf (citing a memorandum prepared by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law in the drafting stages of the Adoption Convention that included among the 
requirements the new convention should be designed to meet “a need for a system of supervision in order to 
ensure that these standards are observed (what can be done to prevent intercountry adoptions from occurring 
which are not in the interest of the child; how can children be protected from being adopted through fraud, 
duress or for monetary reward . . . .)”). For a discussion of the Adoption Convention in the context of norms 
regarding the prohibition of sales of children, see Holly C. Kennard, Curtailing the Sale and Trafficking of 
Children: A Discussion of the Hague Conference Convention in Respect of Intercountry Adoptions, 14 U. PA. 
J. INT’L BUS. L. 632 (1994). 
 299 See supra notes 158–161 and accompanying text. 
 300 Supplementary Slavery Convention, supra note 295, art. 7(a) (emphasis added); accord Slavery 
Convention, supra note 295, art. 1(1). 
 301 Supplementary Slavery Convention, supra note 295, art. 1. 
 302 Id. art. 1(b). 
 303 Id. art. 1(c)(i). 
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by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a 
view to the exploitation of the child or young person or of his 
labour.304 
In sum, such conditions may but do not necessarily involve: the transfer of a 
person for consideration, whether monetary or not; the delivery of a person 
into a state of exploitation (including, but not necessarily, of his labor); the 
exercise of a (presumed) right to convey by a person endowed with ownership 
rights over the person to be conveyed; the exercise of a presumed right to 
convey by a person endowed with familial rights over the person to be 
conveyed. Thus, in respect to child exploitation, it is the exploitation itself that 
leads to the prohibition rather than the compensation, which may or may not be 
received. And, in the case of the child—but presumably often also of the 
woman sold into marriage—the transfer is effected by a person exercising 
familial rather than ownership rights; there is no explicit chattelization, 
although the exercise of such absolute power as is implicated in these transfers 
may obliterate the substantive distinction between parental and property rights 
per se.305 
In all these conditions the person conveyed can neither consent nor resist 
the conveyance itself or the obligations attendant thereto. The characterization 
of a condition as analogous to slavery therefore appears to rest on the negation 
of the right to self-determination (and thus the a priori negation of human 
dignity). But it is also generally acknowledged that a person cannot voluntarily 
sell herself into slavery: actual consent is immaterial, since legal consent is 
impossible.306 The prohibition on slavery would therefore seem to revolve 
around the lack of rights to self-determination of the person in a slave 
condition rather than the modalities of her conveyance to another. Just as 
consent to slavery does not negate slavery—indicating that the lack of consent 
 
 304 Id. art. 1(d) (emphasis added). 
 305 While parental and property rights are exercised under legal separate regimes, they may both entail 
absolute rights over the fate of an object of exchange, be it an inanimate thing or an objectified person. Just 
because a transaction is situated within a familial context, it should not therefore be inured from scrutiny as a 
site in which persons may be treated as things, nor should “the family” qua legal institution—and the power 
relations that it structures—be exempted from analysis as an expression of public policy. For a similar 
perspective, see NUSSBAUM, supra note 145, at 245, noting that “there is no institution that, as such, has 
privacy rights that prevent us from asking how law and public policy have already shaped that institution, and 
how they might better do so.” 
 306 See David Ellerman, Inalienable Rights: A Litmus Test for Theories of Justice, 29 LAW & PHIL. 571, 
582 (2010); See also Palermo Protocol I, supra note 259, art. 3(b) (“The consent of a victim of trafficking in 
persons to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of 
the means set forth in subparagraph (a) [detailing the prohibited means] have been used.”). 
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is not a necessary feature of slavery—payment is also not required. This 
analysis suggests several fundamental differences between the conditions of a 
slave and those of a child whose filiation has been transferred from one person 
to another for compensation, not least that, under current international law, 
most notably the Convention on the Rights of the Child (to which all states 
except the United States and Somalia are parties), the child as such is endowed 
with rights.307 Such rights include “child-sized” rights of self-determination, 
precluding any other person’s exercise of absolute powers.308 Moreover, 
whereas it is a corollary of child status that the child cannot express legally 
binding consent to any contractual transaction, nonetheless the child’s interests 
can be represented by third parties.309 Australia’s National Model to 
Harmonise Regulation of Surrogacy, for example, constructively represents the 
interests of the child through the judicial process, by requiring that the transfer 
of parental rights be subject to a parentage order.310 
But if payment is not a necessary condition for conveyance of a human 
being by one person to another to be slavery, is it nonetheless sufficient to 
trigger a jus cogens violation? In other words, is payment in exchange for a 
person per se a jus cogens violation? A contrary example may be provided by 
the payment of ransom in return for the release of a kidnappee. While 
kidnapping—perhaps as an activity akin to piracy—may be viewed as 
violating a jus cogens prohibition, obtaining a person’s freedom by providing 
consideration cannot. More generally, overarching prohibitions on the 
commercialization of human beings have been critiqued for their radical 
cleavage of phenomena that are often enmeshed.311 And lawmakers have 
 
 307 CRC, supra note 203. 
 308 Id. art. 12. 
 309 CRC, supra note 203, art. 12 ( “1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his 
or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child 
being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 2. For this purpose, the child shall 
in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting 
the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the 
procedural rules of national law.”). 
 310 See STANDING COMM. OF ATTORNEYS-GENERAL AUSTRALIAN HEALTH MINISTERS’ CONFERENCE 
CMTY. & DISABILITY SERVS. MINISTERS’ CONFERENCE, A PROPOSAL FOR A NATIONAL MODEL TO HARMONIZE 
REGULATION OF SURROGACY 10 (2009) (“A parentage order would not be granted merely because the parties 
consent. The Court would need to be satisfied (as an overriding consideration) that the proposed order was in 
the best interests of the child.”). 
 311 As Viviana Zelizer has shown, in intimate relations the lines between purchase and gift blur, and the 
neat dichotomy between the one and the other that informs our judgments reveals itself to be morally blunt and 
sociologically thin. Viviana A. Zelizer, Money, Power and Sex, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 303 (2006). In 
Zelizer’s words: “Where the relations are narrow and short term, we tend to call them sex work. Where they 
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implicitly acknowledged the difficulty of drawing black-letter lines. As noted 
earlier, the Convention on the Rights of the Child enjoins state parties to “take, 
directly, or through public authorities, all appropriate measures to prevent 
improper financial or other gain in connection with an adoption and to deter all 
practices contrary to the objects of the Convention” and the Adoption 
Convention incorporates the same reference to “improper gain,” suggesting 
that some measure of gain may be legitimate.312 Moreover, attentive observers 
of adoption markets have remarked on the failure of strategies designed to 
eradicate commercialization, and, indeed, have argued for its open 
recognition.313 Nonetheless, it seems impossible to ignore that, at the moment 
at which it occurred, the sale itself stripped the person of agency and reduced 
her to an alienable object, one that, having been subject to the possession of 
one person—whether on the basis of familial or property rights—by virtue of 
the exchange engaged in by that person, became the possession of another. 
While recognition of a treaty that either implicitly or explicitly permitted the 
sale of children seems morally repugnant and legally difficult to reconcile with 
a generalized conviction that selling human beings is per se violative of their 
dignity, the catalog of jus cogens prohibitions is undefined and may not extend 
to the sale of human beings outside the context of slavery and conditions 
considered directly analogous to it. 
If a permissive treaty characterized the relevant exchanges as service 
contracts rather than sales, would this make it less likely to be invalidated? 
Such a treaty might run counter to specific prohibitions—for instance, against 
“making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial gain”314—
that might be proscribed in particular jurisdictions without necessarily rising to 
the level of jus cogens. But a requirement that states enforce specific 
performance by gestational carriers could be seen as contravening norms 
regarding indentured servitude and habeas corpus. A permissive treaty might, 
then, risk invalidation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as 
 
are broad and long term, we tend to call them households.” Id. at 308 (citations omitted). See generally 
VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY (2005). 
 312 Adoption Convention, supra note 61, art. 8. It is worth noting that gain implies a potential reward that 
is greater than that implicated in the notion of reimbursement or cost-coverage. 
 313 Good Practice and Real Practice, supra note 281, at 21 (The Secretary of the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law commented that “[t]he connection between money and intercountry adoption is a 
fact of life and it is better to acknowledge that and try to regulate it.”). 
 314 Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 139, art. 3. 
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a function of the mechanisms it prescribes rather than because of the 
exchanges it facilitates.315 
b. Prohibitionist Treaties and the Problem of Statelessness 
It is not only permissive treaties that may be held in breach of jus cogens 
rules: A prohibitionist treaty that de facto entails a substantial risk that children 
may be born who will be rendered stateless by the operation of the treaty itself 
may plausibly also incur the same risk.316 In the case of Baby Manji discussed 
earlier, which revolved around a child born of an Indian gestational carrier at 
the behest of Japanese commissioning parties, the Japanese prohibition on 
surrogacy prevented recognition of the commissioning parties’ parental status 
and hence the attribution of Japanese citizenship to the child.317 
Concomitantly, under then applicable Indian rules, Baby Manji was also not 
considered a child of the gestational carrier and thus not entitled to Indian 
citizenship.318 In Re X and Y, children born to a Ukrainian gestational carrier as 
a result of an agreement with British commissioning parties found themselves 
in a similar quandary.319 Under Ukrainian law, the gestational carrier and her 
husband, having transferred X and Y to the British commissioning parties, had 
neither the rights nor obligations of parenthood; moreover, the children were 
deemed to have the nationality of their commissioning parents.320 But under 
U.K. law, which prohibited commercial surrogacy arrangements and therefore 
recognition of filiations derived from such arrangements, X and Y could have 
been found to be parentless and therefore stateless.321 Save in cases in which 
ius soli rules provide a safety net, children’s citizenship at birth is dependent 
on that of their parents; parentless, they are also stateless. And stateless, they 
are, as Hannah Arendt long ago noted322—in fact even if not in legal theory—
substantially rightless. In a legal perspective, the deprivation of nationality—
the engendering of statelessness—is per se a violation of human rights norms, 
 
 315 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 294, art. 53. 
 316 For a careful discussion of this issue, see Claire Achmad, International Commercial Surrogacy: A 21st 
Century International Human Rights Challenge to Children and Women Requiring Enhanced Protection, 
University of Leiden (unpublished L.L.M. in Public International Law thesis) (on file with the author). 
 317 See POINTS, supra note 72, at 5. 
 318 Id. 
 319 See Re X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy), [2008] EWHC (Fam) 3030 (Eng.). 
 320 Id. para. 8. 
 321 For a discussion of Baby Manji in this perspective, see supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 322 ARENDT, supra note 166, at 296. 
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in particular in relation to children.323A treaty that, because it prohibits 
surrogacy, bars the recognition of the filiation of those born of surrogacy 
arrangements and thereby creates a class of children destined to statelessness 
could well be adjudged in breach of proscriptions against the violation of 
peremptory norms. 
None of these conclusions is foregone. Sales, enforced performance, and 
the engendering of stateless children may all be interpreted so as not to fit 
narrow readings of jus cogens prohibitions. How a treaty regarding surrogacy 
is framed, what transactional narrative it encodes into international law, and 
how human rights law is interpreted will affect the treaty’s ability to stand up 
to its inevitable and legally mandated scrutiny under human rights law. But 
who will make the necessary determinations? Surrogacy narratives are 
influenced by the recursive processes that bind together domestic and cross-
border networks of civil society actors and judicial and legislative institutions 
engaged in more or less closely related dialogues as the official and unofficial 
representatives of one country interact with those of another. From their 
discussions and decisions regarding surrogacy, the nexus between the rules 
governing filiation and those pertaining to nationality and citizenship may 
emerge profoundly reconfigured. At the moment, international commercial 
surrogacy appears destined to remain only loosely regulated: State autonomy 
regarding filiation, nationality, and citizenship, whether as protected under the 
classical Westphalian doctrine of the “reserved domain” of state jurisdiction or 
as conceded in human rights regimes under doctrines akin to the margin of 
appreciation, will ensure the survival of conflicting legal frameworks. 
 
 
 323 “Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.” ICCPR, supra note 169, art. 24(3). The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights also provides that “Everyone has the right to a nationality. . . . No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his nationality.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 146, art. 15. On the 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality as a recognized tort under the Alien Torts Claims Act, see In re South 
African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
